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A New Power?: Civil Offenses and
Presidential Clemency
NOAH A. MESSING†
INTRODUCTION
Article II of the U.S Constitution empowers presidents to
pardon “Offences against the United States.” The traditional
understanding of that power suggests that presidential
clemency extends only to crimes. That view, however, is
mistaken. This Article shows that presidents may also
pardon civil offenses and opens a discussion about how this
power could be used by presidents.
Federal civil offenses are laws or regulations that impose
penalties on offenders—but that cannot result in the offender
being sent to prison.1 Parties who violate these laws may be
† Lecturer in the Practice of Law and Legal Writing, Yale Law School. The author
received invaluable support from the Lillian Goldman Law Library at Yale Law
School, including Julie Graves Krishnaswami, John Nann, Michael
VanderHeijden, Drew Adan, and Michael Widener. The Article benefited from
going through the wringer at Yale Law School’s faculty workshop and Stetson
University College of Law’s faculty colloquium. Both faculties provided superb
insights. Valuable advice, at various stages of the writing process, was provided
by William Eskridge, Gene Fidell, Heather Gerken, Jon Michaels, Nicholas
Parrillo, Judith Resnik, Cristina Rodriguez, Roberta Romano, and Louis J.
Virelli, III. A number of law students provided excellent research assistance:
Hillary Aidun, Ahsan Barkatullah, William Clayman, Jesse Hogin, Philipp
Kotlaba, Aaron Levine, Richard Luedeman, Hava Mirell, Victoria Pasculli, Jenna
Pavelec, Ben Picozzi, Marina Romani, Jessica Samuels, Allison Turbiville, Cobus
van der Ven, and Theodore Wojcik. The cheery staff at the State Library of
Victoria in Melbourne directed me to an extraordinary trove of records from the
late 1700s that contributed to this Article’s discussion of English pardons. P.S.
Ruckman, Jr., Editor of the Pardon Power Blog, provided invaluable advice at the
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fined,2 and in some cases their property may be forfeited.3 As
one federal agency observed, “[c]ivil penalties are an
important element of regulatory enforcement, allowing
agencies to punish violators appropriately and to serve as a
deterrent to future violations.”4 Thus, civil offenses resemble
criminal laws: both types of offenses prohibit and punish
specific misconduct. But no careful analysis has ever been
undertaken of whether presidential clemency is available for
civil offenses.
This Article provides a comprehensive assessment of that
question. Its methodology mirrors the tools that the Supreme
Court has consistently used in resolving past cases about the
pardon power. Thus, this Article’s analysis is based on
constitutional text, constitutional structure, and history. As
the Court has explained, “the arguments drawn from the
common law, from the power of the King under the British
Constitution, which plainly was the prototype of this clause,
from the legislative history of the clause in the Convention,
and from the ordinary meaning of its words, are much more
relevant and convincing” than other interpretative tools.5
Likewise, the Court has noted that the pardon power “must
be construed with reference to its meaning at the time of its

beginning of this project and shared his incomparable data set of presidential
pardons—spreadsheets that contributed immeasurably to Part III’s discussion of
historical U.S. pardons.
1. Some states still allow for debtors’ prisons, and unpaid civil penalties are
considered debt. See Monica Davey, Ferguson One of 2 Missouri Suburbs Sued
Over Gantlet of Traffic Fines and Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2015, at A8. See also
28 U.S.C. § 2007(a) (2012) (prohibiting federal debtors’ prisons in states where
such prisons have been abolished).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 2461(a) (2012) (“Whenever a civil fine, penalty or pecuniary
forfeiture is prescribed for the violation of an Act of Congress without specifying
the mode of recovery or enforcement thereof, it may be recovered in a civil
action.”).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1918(a) (2012).
4. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE., GAO-03-409, CIVIL PENALTIES: AGENCIES
UNABLE TO FULLY ADJUST PENALTIES FOR INFLATION UNDER CURRENT LAW, at
Highlights (2003), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-409 (Mar. 14, 2003).
5. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118 (1925).
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adoption.”6 This Article focuses on those methodologies, and
those methodologies suggest that civil offenses are subject to
executive clemency.
But perhaps the most compelling reason to infer that
presidents may pardon civil offenses stems not from
historical analysis but from a simple, intuitive example. The
pardon power is, for federal criminal offenses, nearly
“unlimited,”7 and presidents may pardon murder,8 treason,9
and kidnapping.10 It would therefore be bizarre if a president
could pardon a farmer who murdered federal officials and
committed treason11 but was powerless to remit a $117.11
fine that the same farmer incurred for growing too much
wheat—the only civil offense in the bunch.12
This intuition, however, conflicts with more than 180
years of dicta suggesting that the pardon power extends only
to criminal offenses.13 In 1833, Chief Justice Marshall wrote
that “[a] pardon . . . exempts the individual, on whom it is
6. Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 311 (1855). See also Schick v. Reed,
419 U.S. 256, 262 (1974); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. at 108-09 (“The language
of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the
common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was
framed and adopted.”); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 311-12.
7. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866).
8. See Schick, 419 U.S. at 257-59 (upholding clemency order for murderer of
eight-year-old girl).
9. See, e.g., Andrew Johnson, President Johnson’s Amnesty Proclamation,
N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 1865), http://www.nytimes.com/1865/05/30/news/presidentjohnson-s-amnesty-proclamation-restoration-rights-property-except.html
(offering pardons to persons who had participated in a rebellion).
10. See Pardon of Rollie Rector (Mar. 21, 1938), Records of the Office of the
Pardon Attorney, 46 Pardon Warrants, 6/19/1893 – 6/30/1952, at 211, located
in Record Group 204, National Archives, College Park, MD [hereinafter Pardon
Warrants RG 204].
11. See Debra Burlingame, The Clintons’ Terror Pardons, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12,
2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120277819085260827; Pardons Granted by
President George H. W. Bush (1989-1993), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/ghwbush-pardons (last updated Jan. 26, 2015).
12. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114-15, 133 (1942) (upholding civil
penalty of $117.11 for harvesting wheat in excess of 1941 marketing quota).
13. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1915); United States v.
Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833).
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bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he
has committed.”14 Likewise, the Department of Justice’s
website explains that the pardon power extends to “only
federal criminal convictions.”15
Approximately a dozen scholars have confronted whether
civil offenses may be pardoned, and more than half have
concluded that the president’s clemency power extends only
to criminal misconduct.16 For example, John Yoo—hardly an
advocate for constrained executive power—concluded that
“the Pardon Clause . . . concerns crimes, not civil
violations.”17 But Yoo provided no evidence for this
conclusion: for this proposition, he and his coauthor cited the
Pardon Clause, without any commentary.18 Other
commentators have made similar statements—also without
delving into the available evidence.19 In fact, no scholar—on
either side of this limited debate—has carefully discussed the
available evidence. This Article is the first to explore that
evidence.
14. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 160 (emphasis added); see James N. Jorgensen,
Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President’s Prerogative to Escape
Accountability, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 345, 348 n.18 (1993) (“Chief Justice Marshall
supplied the classic definition of a pardon.”); Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of
Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1,
113 n.211 (2005) (referring to this quotation as “John Marshall’s classic
formulation of executive clemency”); see also Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39,
58 (1877) (treating, without analysis, the words “crimes” and “offences”
synonymously); In re North, 62 F.3d 1434, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion from Wilson about presidential pardons).
15. Pardon Information and Instructions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardon-information-and-instructions (Jan. 13,
2015) (emphasis added). When asked to justify this statement, the Office of the
U.S. Pardon Attorney declined to definitively state whether the pardon power
extends to federal civil violations. Letter from the Office of the Pardon Attorney,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Author (Feb. 4, 2014) (“[W]hen we receive an inquiry
concerning clemency for a federal civil violation, we advise the questioner of our
policy not to accept such applications for processing.”).
16. See infra Part II.
17. Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the
Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 842 (2013).
18. Id. n.390.
19. See infra Part II.
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The relative quietude of this debate stems from
underestimating the consequence of the power to pardon civil
offenses; scholars have provided absolutely no discussion of
what this power would mean for the executive branch. Most
obviously, a president could pardon a large civil fine; these
fines now routinely reach nine figures, and have exceeded
five billion dollars in multiple instances in recent years.20 A
president could also influence policy directly, such as by
granting amnesty each year on April 16 to cancel any civil
penalties owed by citizens who failed to purchase healthcare
as required under the Affordable Care Act,21 or to issue
individual pardons of any undocumented aliens detained for
violating a civil offense related to immigration, or even to
pardon an entire class of taxpayers who paid a lower
marginal rate than Congress decreed. These approaches, of
course, would be controversial—and this Article refrains
from trying to draw the exact line at which, for instance, an
issuance of amnesty would fall afoul of the Take Care
20. See Margaret Cronin Fisk et al., BP Pays Record $18.7 Billion to Settle
Claims
in
Gulf
Oil
Spill,
BLOOMBERG
(July
2,
2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-02/bp-said-to-settle-2010gulf-oil-spill-claims-with-u-s-states (“A record $5.5 billion will cover federal
penalties under the Clean Water Act, topping the previous high of $1 billion.”);
Aruna Viswanatha, Banks to Pay $5.6 Billion in Probes, WALL ST. J. (May 20,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/global-banks-to-pay-5-6-billion-in-penaltiesin-fx-libor-probe-1432130400; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bank of
America to Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic Justice Department Settlement for
Financial Fraud Leading up to and During the Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-pay-1665-billion-historic-justicedepartment-settlement-financial-fraud-leading; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Justice Department Collects More Than $8 Billion in Civil and
Criminal
Cases
in
Fiscal
Year
2013
(Jan.
9,
2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-collects-more-8-billion-civiland-criminal-cases-fiscal-year-2013; Jon Eisenberg, Brother Can You Spare $8.9
Billion? Making Sense of SEC Civil Money Penalties, K&L GATES LEGAL INSIGHT
(Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/7b9cf03a-e90d-4bbaa373-bb494b063f9b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e5d51e6b-f798-4bf780be-ebeb853f0ad9/SEC_alert_021114.pdf (“Between 2004 and 2013, the SEC
obtained orders in judicial and administrative proceedings requiring defendants
and respondents to pay $8.9 billion in money penalties.”); List of largest
pharmaceutical settlements, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=List_of_largest_pharmaceutical_settlements&oldid=706848959 (last visited
Apr. 17, 2016).
21. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) (2012).
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Clause.22 This Article does not dispute that such practices
would produce furor in Congress or among voters. (Criminal
pardons have done so, too—such as the pardons of Richard
Nixon and Marc Rich). Rather, this Article merely makes the
case that the president may pardon civil offenses, but it
leaves to future discussions the exact determination of where
legal or political checks will impose fetters on this power.
Even so, this Article suggests a way that presidents and
Congress could work together to use mass civil pardons (i.e.,
“amnesty”) for the good of the republic. Such amnesties could
provide “cloud cover” (i.e., temporary relief from problematic
legislation and regulations) when these laws get too costly,
when they impede important goals, or when a crisis arises.
Cloud cover pardons—i.e., regularly recurring amnesty—
could help in these situations without repealing or altering
the underlying statutes or regulations, which might take a
long time for Congress to amend, might prove hard to
reenact, and might require costly ancillary legislation to
appease holdouts. For instance, if the banking system
seized up (as looked possible in 2008 and 2009), the president
could pardon banks each night for failing to comply with
various civil-offense laws that raised their costs or impeded
their ability to quickly borrow or lend money. Or the
president could pardon companies that traded with a country
that Congress had subjected to economic sanctions if that
country were facing a sudden risk of being toppled by ISIS:
the amnesty could lift sanctions faster than Congress could—
and without divulging classified information to numerous
Hill offices.23 Or if the United States were subjected to an oil
blockade, the president and Congress could agree that the
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The Supreme Court’s 4-4 split in a recent case
deprived scholars of guidance about the limits of the Take Care Clause. United
States v. Texas, No. 15-674 (2016) (per curiam).
23. Cf. PayPal to Pay $7.7 Million in U.S. Treasury Sanctions Case, REUTERS
(Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/25/us-usa-treasury-ebayidUSKBN0ML28620150325 (discussing civil fine imposed on PayPal for
processing payments from sanctioned countries). To the extent that one
administration enforced particular laws more aggressively than another—as
seems to be the case with Treasury penalties during President Obama’s
Administration—a successor might wish to use civil-offense clemency to reduce
the penalties imposed by an earlier president.
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president would spur domestic oil production by granting
recurring, daily pardons to violators; oil producers could then
bypass many regulations in order to jumpstart production,
but these laws would still be on the books as soon as the crisis
passed.
This approach of using the pardon power broadly and
quickly would, when combined with legislative acquiescence24
(to prevent concerns under the Take Care Clause25) resemble
how English monarchs and Parliament once jointly issued
intermittent peacetime acts of amnesty.26 This Article briefly
reviews this tradition of executive-legislative amnesty
partnership in England in the hope that it can serve as a
model for lawfully and non-controversially neutralizing
statutes and regulations that have fallen into desuetude or
that pose problems for the nation during a crisis. (This
application of the clemency power to add temporary cloud
cover over statutes and regulations will likely be this Article’s
most controversial idea.)
But notwithstanding the above points, this Article
focuses not on the possible uses of the civil clemency power
but on the narrower proposition that civil offenses may be
pardoned. Subsequent scholarly work will explore how and
when presidents can or should deploy this untapped power.
This Article simply establishes that it is very likely that the
power exists.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the
conventional understanding of the scope of the president’s
clemency powers. Part II summarizes the existing debate
about whether presidents may pardon civil offenses. Part III
shows, through an array of methodological approaches, that
the president may pardon civil offenses. That is, the
president may negate penalties owed to the federal
government for wrongdoing (but may not cancel debts or
24. A non-binding resolution could be obtained more quickly than Congress
could enact or repeal legislation, and would not require permanent changes to
laws that would, once the crisis passed, still be salutary. Or the president could
simply ask House and Senate leaders to help develop the scope of the amnesty
order.
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
26. See infra Part III.A.1.
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judgments owed by one private party to another). This Article
concludes by briefly discussing various potential uses of the
power to grant clemency for civil offenses.27
I. ORIGINS AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE PARDON
POWER
Article II, section 2, clause 1 provides: “The
President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment.”28 Although the Supreme Court has
described the pardon prerogative as “unlimited, with the
exception” of impeachment,29 the Court was imprecise: other
legal and practical restrictions curtail this power, Parts I.A
and I.B describe these restrictions. Part I.C explores the
power’s positive dimensions.
A. Legal Limits on the Pardon Power
Article II imposes express and implied limits on the
pardon power—four, in all.30
First, the president may only pardon federal offenses, or,
“Offences against the United States.”31 Thus, the president is

27. This Article does not suggest that civil penalties routinely reflect excessive
legislation or regulation. But no set of laws is perfect, nor is the application of
laws just in all cases. Just as newly discovered facts might warrant clemency, a
civil offense might be excessive, or its consequences might be dire.
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
29. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866). The Court has also
described the pardon as “the determination of the ultimate authority that the
public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment
fixed.” Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (emphasis added).
30. Some commentators reach slightly different counts. E.g., T.J. HALSTEAD,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20829, AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDONING
POWER 1 (2006) (“First, the pardon power is limited to ‘offenses against the United
States’ . . . . Likewise, the pardon power does not extend to ‘Cases of
Impeachment.’”); Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional
Pardon Power, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1673 (2001) (citing three limitations).
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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powerless to grant clemency in state criminal (or civil)
cases.32
Second, the Constitution expressly prevents the
president from granting relief “in Cases of Impeachment.”33
Third, the president may not pardon a crime before it
occurs.34 Although the president may pardon an offender
immediately after the crime is committed, he may not exempt
anyone from the law in advance.35
Fourth, the president may not pardon someone held in
contempt in a case between private parties—even if the
individual is jailed for his or her contempt. The Supreme
Court reached this conclusion in 1925 in Ex parte
Grossman.36 The Court concluded that the judicial contempt
power was insulated from executive clemency if that power
was being exercised to help third parties—such as by
compelling witnesses to testify in private civil disputes. If,
however, the criminal contempt was imposed for the court’s

32. E.g., Hickey v. Schomig, 240 F. Supp. 2d 793, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[N]o
federal official has the authority to commute a sentence imposed by a state
court.”); Pardon Information and Instructions, supra note 15 (“[T]he President
cannot pardon a state criminal offense.”).
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The president could theoretically pardon his
own crimes. But see Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege
Against Prosecution, 2 NEXUS 11, 11 (1997) (reaching the contrary conclusion);
Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential
Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 781 (1996) (same).
34. Other than U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (which authorizes Congress to
issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal to authorize someone to commit acts of
piracy in advance), pre-approval to violate the law is almost completely absent
from the U.S. legal system. Cf. Bradley E. Markano, Enabling State Deregulation
of Marijuana Through Executive Branch Nonenforcement, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289,
291 (2015) (discussing decisions to deprioritize enforcement of federal marijuana
law).
35. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866).
36. 267 U.S. 87, 110-11 (1925).
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benefit (e.g., to punish a misbehaving lawyer), the president
may pardon the offense.37 No other clear limits exist.38
B. Practical Limits on the Pardon Power
In addition to these formal limitations, presidential
clemency is limited in numerous practical and political ways.
For instance, and most obviously, the president cannot
control public opinion or discourse, so if the president grants
clemency to a notorious figure (such as President Ford’s
pardon of ex-President Nixon or President Clinton’s pardon
of fugitive financier, Marc Rich) the pardon cannot spare the
wrongdoer
from
scathing
comments
and
social
consequences.39 Likewise, someone who was convicted and
then pardoned could still be referred to by private citizens as
a convicted felon: law cannot trump memory.
Another major obstacle is political. Presidents—
including critics of over-criminalization40—grant few

37. Id. at 122. This holding produces some oddities. For instance, destroying
documents in connection with a private case could be a statutory crime. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lundwall, 1 F. Supp. 2d 249, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 1503). The president could pardon that crime. But if the judge held the
document-destroying witness in criminal contempt for interfering with the civil
dispute, that order would be beyond presidential clemency.
38. One other possible limit exists. The Court once held unanimously that a
convict must accept a pardon for it to take effect. Burdick v. United States, 236
U.S. 79, 94 (1915). But twelve years later the Court weakened this doctrine
significantly, without expressly overruling it. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480,
486 (1927).
39. See JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 3 (2009)
(“President George H. W. Bush’s pardons of Caspar Weinberger and other IranContra figures; President Bill Clinton’s conditional clemency offer to members of
the FALN, along with his ‘last-minute’ pardons of Marc Rich and others; and
President George W. Bush’s commutation of Scooter Libby’s prison sentence were
all big stories that earned considerable media attention and general public
condemnation.”).
40. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the NAACP
Conference
(July
14,
2015)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/remarks-presidentnaacp-conference) (“Over the last few decades, we’ve . . . locked up more and more
nonviolent drug offenders than ever before, for longer than ever before . . . . In far
too many cases, the punishment simply does not fit the crime.”).
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clemency petitions.41 It was not always so. In 1896, there
were 301 prisoners in federal penitentiaries,42 and
approximately 64.1% of them received presidential
clemency.43 But that was as good as things got for federal
prisoners. The federal clemency rate plummeted to 10.3% by
1903.44
That rate would be welcome to modern federal prisoners.
In 2014, the average number of daily federal prisoners was
approximately 214,149,45 but, in that same year, President
Obama granted just thirteen pardons and nine petitions for
commutation46—resulting in a clemency rate of 0.01%. Put
differently, the chances of a given prisoner receiving a pardon
in 1896 were over 5000 times greater than they are today.
Convincing a president to invoke the pardon power has
become the greatest obstacle to getting one.47 And

41. As of March 2016, President Obama granted 70 pardons of 2306 petitions
and 187 commutations of 19,765 petitions. President George W. Bush granted 189
of 2498 pardons and 11 of 8576 commutations. By contrast, President Carter,
granted 534 of 1581 pardons and 29 of 1046 commutations. Clemency Statistics,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemencystatistics. As this Article was going to press, President Obama granted 214
commutations in a single day, which apparently increased his net number of
commutations (as of early August 2016) to 562. Press Release, The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Grants Commutations (Aug. 3,
2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/08/03/president-obamagrants-commutations; Current Fiscal Year Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. (Aug. 15, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/current-fiscal-yearclemency-statistics.
42. W. H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER
(1941).

OF THE

PRESIDENT 111 tbl.IV

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. BOP: Population Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp.
46. Clemency Statistics, supra note 41.
47. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 561, 580-82 (2001). Additionally, the Department of Justice has adopted
a regulation imposing a presumptive five-year waiting period for a federal
prisoner to petition for a pardon, which reduces the number of people who may
seek a pardon through that agency (although the president could, of course, issue
a pardon at any time after an offense is committed, without obtaining pre-
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commutations, which reduce or cancel a punishment but
(unlike pardons) do not negate the underlying conviction,48
are even scarcer.49
Other limits exist on the pardon power. To begin, even if
the above obstacles are overcome and an offender somehow
receives a pardon, once the offender has paid a fine, the
pardon cannot help her recoup this payment.50 (To be clear,
no one disputes that criminal fines may be pardoned.) 51
Likewise, pardoned crimes are sometimes considered in
sentencing a defendant in a subsequent case, at least by state
courts.52 Thus, a recidivist bank robber who is pardoned
might get a longer sentence in state court when he next robs
a bank. The private sector, too, could continue to ask job
applicants or loan applicants about their convictions and
make adverse decisions based on their responses.53
Similarly, a pardon cannot spare an individual from
being prosecuted for an ongoing offense. For instance, if it is

approval from the Department of Justice). 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2016); Hoffstadt, supra,
at 581.
48. Jeffrey Crouch, The President’s Power to Commute: Is It Still Relevant?, 9
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 681, 684 (2012).
49. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Common-Law Writs and Federal Common Lawmaking
on Collateral Review, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2002) (“Commutation of a
sentence may be of greater utility because it does not have a five-year waiting
period, but it is more difficult to obtain . . . [because] [c]ommutation of sentence
‘is an extraordinary remedy that is very rarely granted.’”) (emphasis added)
(quoting 28 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2001)).
50. Jorgensen, supra note 14, at 349 (“The president’s power to remit fines and
forfeitures, however, is limited to monetary penalties which have not yet been
paid to the United States.”) (citing Pollock v. Bridgeport Steam-Boat Co. (The
Laura), 114 U.S. 411, 413 (1885); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877)).
51. See infra Part I.C.
52. For example, Massachusetts allows past crimes to be considered in
determining whether a convict is a “habitual criminal,” unless those crimes have
been pardoned specifically on the ground that the person was innocent. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 279, § 25(a) (2014). This approach by state courts withstands
preemption analysis under the Supremacy Clause. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S.
51, 57, 59 (1914).
53. See Whether a Presidential Pardon Expunges Judicial and Executive
Branch Records of a Crime, 30 Op. O.L.C. 104, 105-06 (2006).
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a federal offense to possess a wiretapping device,54 a
president may pardon all past violations of that law. But if
the pardon recipient continues to possess the illegal device, a
new “possession” crime occurs the moment after the
president issues a pardon. This point merely extends the
limitation, noted above, against pardoning future offenses.
This same principle is reflected in gun amnesties: when an
illegally owned gun is turned in, the one-time gun-owner
ends his or her crime. (This point explains why this Article’s
idea of “cloud cover” would require recurring pardons.)
Theoretically, nothing bars a president from issuing
recurring pardons—e.g., pardoning the owner of an illegal
wiretapping device or machine gun each morning to foil any
attempt to prosecute the offender. But in practice, no
president has issued this sort of recurring pardon. That
approach—discussed further in the Conclusion—would
almost certainly infuriate Congress unless Congress
assented to this approach. The limitation on this sort of
pardon, however, is political, not legal. The Supreme Court
has acknowledged (albeit in dicta) that various types of
controversial pardons would be lawful, however distasteful
their effects, and impeachment (rather than an injunction)
would be the available remedy for the president’s
opponents.55 Further, Congress has a variety of tools to
prevent abuses. The ultimate failsafe is that Congress may
impeach the president for abusing the pardon power, 56 but
Congress may also, as examples, hold hearings to embarrass
the president or subpoena the president’s aides,57 withhold
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (2012).
55. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925) (“Exceptional cases . . . would
suggest a resort to impeachment rather than to a narrow and strained
construction of the general powers of the President.”).
56. CROUCH, supra note 39, at 18 (describing Hamilton’s success in “attempting
to quell Anti-Federalist concerns”); see also Jaired Stallard, Abuse of the Pardon
Power: A Legal and Economic Perspective, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 103, 132
(2002) (noting that a president could lose his pension and entitlements for
abusing the pardon power).
57. 2 U.S.C. § 190l (2012) (describing process to subpoena witnesses); 2 U.S.C.
§ 192 (2012) (describing penalties); J. Richard Broughton, Congressional Inquiry
and the Federal Criminal Law, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 457, 480 (2012) (discussing
hearings to embarrass the president); See generally Todd B. Tatelman,
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funding from the president’s favored programs,58 or urge
prosecutors to bring corruption charges against a president
who issued a pardon in exchange for a payment or other quid
pro quo benefit.59
Finally, some courts have rejected attempts to dismiss
civil suits after the defendant received a pardon, suggesting
that a pardon does not spare its recipient from civil liability
to private parties.60 This principle is sometimes invoked,
mistakenly, to suggest that pardons cannot apply to anything
that is “civil.”61 As Part III discusses, that proves too much.
When a private party files suit against a criminal who is also
a tortfeasor, the lawsuit is based on torts against the private
party, not acts against the United States. The pardon power
empowers the president to pardon “offences against the
United States,” not injuries to private parties.

Presidential Aides: Immunity from Congressional Process?, 39 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 385 (2009) (discussing expansion of executive privilege to exempt
presidential aides from compulsory process and congressional subpoenas).
58. Steven Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1174 n.108 (1992)
(recognizing “Congress’s established power to refuse to fund the executive
department” and “Congress’s power to deny funds to the executive department”).
59. Leonard B. Boudin, The Presidential Pardons of James R. Hoffa and
Richard M. Nixon: Have the Limitations on the Pardon Power Been Exceeded?, 48
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 16 (1976).
60. In Lettsome v. Waggoner, a district court held that defendant’s
gubernatorial pardon did not bar plaintiff’s civil assault proceeding and
subsequent award of punitive damages. 672 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D.V.I. 1987).
Similarly, there were three private lawsuits against ex-President Nixon for
recording conversations. Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1185-86 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Clark v. United
States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). None of the opinions
mentions Nixon’s pardon as a defense against these claims. And decades later,
Valerie Plame sued Scooter Libby in a Bivens action for revealing her role in the
CIA. Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
61. See, e.g., Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law,
6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 253, 282-83 (2010) (“[T]he pardon power is limited to
relieving the consequences of criminal offenses, since interference with the vested
property rights of private parties is the functional equivalent of attempting to
remit civil liability, which is likewise beyond the scope of the President’s
pardoning authority.”).
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C. What Is Left? A Broad Power to Pardon
Notwithstanding the above limitations, the pardon
power is remarkably broad. The president may pardon any
federal offense other than impeachment,62 and may pardon
any number of people at once.63 Likewise, the president may
pardon any number of offenses committed by a single
offender.64
Critical to this Article, the president may undisputedly
cancel criminal fines and criminal forfeitures—regardless of
whether the criminal fine or criminal forfeiture65 is attended
by a prison sentence or whether the president cancels the
prison sentence.66 Notably, commentators usually observe
that presidential clemency may cancel “fines” or “forfeitures”
rather than specifying “criminal fines” or “criminal
forfeitures,”67 yet this power is typically treated as applying
only to criminal fines and forfeitures.68

62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
63. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601-02 (1896).
64. For example, President Clinton pardoned Marc Rich for “wire fraud, mail
fraud, racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, criminal forfeiture, income tax
evasion, and trading with Iran in violation of trade embargo.” Pardons Granted
by President William J. Clinton (1993-2001), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/clinton-pardons.
65. Terrance G. Reed, On the Importance of Being Civil: Constitutional
Limitations on Civil Forfeiture, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 255, 256-57 (1994)
(explaining the difference between civil and criminal forfeitures).
66. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning
Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 595 (1991) (citing HUMBERT, supra note
42, at 50 n.63) (“[T]here is no doubt that, in practice, the President may remit
without pardoning.”).
67. See, e.g., Kobil, supra note 66, at 577 (“The clemency power also embraces
remission of fines and forfeitures.”); Krent, supra note 30, at 1673 (“[T]he
president may remit fines and forfeitures”); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Economics of Presidential Pardons and Commutations, 38 J. LEGAL
STUD. 61, 62 (2009) (“The pardon clause is understood to include . . . remissions
of fines.”).
68. See infra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
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In addition to being broad, the pardon power is flexible.
The president may reduce, but not cancel, a sentence;69
uphold a conviction while negating the punishment;70 delay
the start date of a convict’s imprisonment (i.e., grant a
respite);71 temporarily release a prisoner from custody;72 or
make a pardon “conditional.”73 Conditional pardons allow the
president to demand a wide array of terms in exchange for
clemency that implicate other constitutional rights, such as
abstaining from union politics or renouncing violence.74
The handful of limitations should not obscure the pardon
power’s stunning potential. There are more than 195,000
federal prisoners.75 The president could release them all
tomorrow. And then, as an encore, he could release all of the
prisoners in Washington, D.C.76 and use the clemency power
69. The pardon power includes “reducing the amount of [a] fine.” Ex parte
Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 319 (1855).
70. Douglas A. Berman & Alyson S. White, Looking at the Libby Case from a
Sentencing Perspective, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 1 (2007) (“President Bush exercised
his executive clemency power to commute Scooter Libby’s thirty-month prison
sentence in its entirety (though he left in place Libby’s convictions, the fine, and
the supervised release term).”).
71. Crouch, supra note 48, at 684 (“Other options for the chief executive
include . . . to grant a reprieve or respite (which simply delays the full
punishment).”).
72. Kristen H. Fowler, Note, Limiting the Federal Pardon Power, 83 IND. L.J.
1651, 1652 (2008).
73. See Ex Parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 307. A condition may be
precedent or subsequent, and must be accepted by the offender. Burdick v. United
States, 236 U.S. 79, 90 (1915); id. at 311-12. Conditional pardons have required
offenders to “refrain from alcohol, provide support for family members, leave the
country, join the navy, drop claims against the United States, or restrict their
travel or speech.” Krent, supra note 30, at 1665. However, conditions are limited
in that they may not be unconstitutional—although some conditions come close
to falling afoul of this principle. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 264 (1974).
74. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1238-40 (D.D.C. 1974) (describing
President Nixon’s pardon of Jimmy Hoffa conditioned on Hoffa abstaining from
union politics); Krent, supra note 30, at 1667 (describing President Clinton’s
conditional pardon of FALN terrorists conditioned on renouncing violence).
75. BOP: Population Statistics, supra note 45 (noting that, as of May 16, 2016,
there were 195,709 federal prisoners).
76. See Pardon Information and Instructions, supra note 15 (“[T]he President’s
pardon power extends to convictions adjudicated in the Superior Court of the
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to restore the civil rights of all citizens who have lost those
rights through felony convictions.77 The president could
thereby enable these individuals to vote, hold office, and
serve on a jury or as a witness.78 But no president, of course,
has ever done this—a reality check that this Article
encourages readers to remember as they assess whether civil
clemency would be used irresponsibly.
Finally, the Take Care Clause, which requires the
president to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,”
does not ordinarily restrict the president’s pardon power.79 In
fact, the very essence of a pardon is that the president has
decided that an offense should not be punished as Congress
intended (or as a statute is written, even if its text leads to
unintended consequences). But even pardons that flaunt
Congress do not usually permit a challenge under the
ordinarily non-justiciable Take Care Clause,80 and even if
such a challenge were justiciable, the Supreme Court has
indicated that impeachment and other remedies, rather than
a lawsuit, are the appropriate check.81 Still, the Take Care
District of Columbia and military court-martial proceedings. However, the
President cannot pardon a state criminal offense.”).
77. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., SENT’G PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF
FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 1 (2012) (“5.85
million Americans are forbidden to vote because of ‘felon disenfranchisement,’ or
laws restricting voting rights for those convicted of felony-level crimes.”).
78. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877) (“A pardon . . . restores to
[the offender] all his civil rights.”); 3 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES: PARDON 272 (1939) (“One
of the civil rights restored by pardon is the right to vote.”); id. at 270-71 (A pardon
restores “the right to hold office, to vote, to serve on a jury, to be a witness, and,
in earlier times, the return of property forfeited by reason of, and punishment for,
conviction of crime. But it does not restore offices forfeited, nor property or
interests vested in others in consequence of conviction.”).
79. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
80. See David Bernstein, Supreme Court Bombshell: Does Obama’s
Immigration Guidance Violate the Take Care Clause?, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/01/19/supreme-court-bombshell-does-obamas-immigrationguidance-violate-the-take-care-clause (observing that the Supreme Court has
never considered a Take Care Clause case until a sua sponte instruction by the
Court to address that issue in a pending case).
81. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925).
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Clause creates an enormous political check on presidential
excesses in the use of pardons: extreme executive use of
clemency in a manner that offended Congress would spark a
vicious showdown between the Executive and Legislative
branches.
Taken together, the various general propositions
discussed above suggest that the pardon power is enormously
broad and flexible. Nevertheless, these propositions do not
address whether the president may grant clemency when a
person violates federal laws and regulations that impose civil
penalties. Part II turns to that issue.
II. THE EXISTING DEBATE OVER CLEMENCY FOR CIVIL
OFFENSES
This Part summarizes the debate—limited though it is—
about whether presidents may pardon civil offenses.
Most jurists and scholars who have discussed this issue
accept Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum that “[a]
pardon . . . exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed,
from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed.”82 To be clear, the very concept of a “civil offense”
did not come into existence until more than fifty years later.83
And Marshall’s comment (that pardons related to “crime[s]”)
arose in a case that had nothing to do with civil offenses: the
issue was whether a bank robber had the right to reject a
pardon that the president has signed.84
But nonbinding dicta sometimes proves durable.
Marshall’s position was later reiterated by Chief Justice
Taft—also in dicta, also in a case that had nothing to do with
civil offenses.85 Like Marshall, Taft (a former president by
82. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833) (emphasis added).
83. See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and
the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 937 n.91
(1926) (citing 1846 as marking the beginning of civil offenses in the United
States).
84. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 160-61.
85. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. at 120-22 (“Executive clemency exists to
afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation or
enforcement of the criminal law.”) (emphasis added).
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this time) presumed without analysis that the federal pardon
power applies only to criminal offenses. But civil offenses did
exist by the time he wrote in 1925,86 and Taft’s observation
proved tenacious. He made his statement without addressing
whether civil offenses may also be pardoned. Even so,
numerous leading scholars now echo his conclusion that
pardons relate only to “crimes,” leading them to imply that
civil offenses87 or “civil cases”88 lie beyond the pardon power—
even though they do not analyze the issue.
Where these scholars have directly addressed whether
the pardon power reaches civil offenses, their conclusions do
not explore fully the available evidence. For instance,
Delahunty and Yoo observe that “the Pardon
Clause . . . concerns crimes, not civil violations.”89 But as
noted in the Introduction, they offer no evidence for their
claim. Instead, they cite the bare constitutional text.90

86. See Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103, 105 (1909).
87. See, e.g., David Gray Adler, The President’s Pardon Power, in INVENTING
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 209, 212 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1989) (suggesting
that the term “offences” was “virtually synonymous with crimes in English law”)
(emphasis added); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause,
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 31 (“The Pardons Clause also specifies that the President’s
pardon power does not extend to ‘Cases of Impeachment.’ That provision was,
strictly speaking, unnecessary because impeachment is not a criminal proceeding
and therefore could never come within the pardon power encompassed by the
grant of the ‘executive Power.’”) (emphasis added).
THE

88. This phrase—“civil cases”—is an ambiguous term, as it fails to clarify
whether the authors are referring to civil actions between private parties or civil
actions brought by the government to enforce statutory and regulatory
requirements that have been violated, but it certainly does not suggest that civil
offenses may be pardoned. See, e.g., BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL
CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR ENEMIES 40-41 (2012)
(“Pardons are thus limited to federal crimes; they cannot affect civil lawsuits,
state criminal matters, or congressional impeachments.”); James Pfiffner, Pardon
Power, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 261, 261 (David F. Forte &
Matthew Spalding eds., 2d ed., 2014) (noting that “pardons are limited to offenses
against the United States (i.e., not civil or state cases) and that they cannot affect
an impeachment process”) (emphasis added).
89. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 17, at 842 (emphasis added).
90. Delahunty and Yoo support this proposition only with the following
footnote: “U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.” Id. at 842 n.390.
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Similarly, Samuel Morison, an attorney specializing in
executive clemency, states that “the pardon power extends
only to ‘[o]ffenses against the United States,’ as distinguished
from civil penalties or state offenses,” but he, too, provides no
authorities for his claim—other than the dictum of Chief
Justice Marshall from before civil offenses existed.91
So, too, Evan Caminker reached that conclusion in his
student comment, wherein he suggested that the pardon
power extends only to criminal offenses.92 Caminker based
his conclusion on an overly aggressive reading of Ex parte
Grossman, the Court’s 1925 opinion.93 But that case involved
judicial contempt, not a civil-offense statute. The Court’s
rationale for concluding that the president could not pardon
civil contempt was that doing so would vitiate the power of
courts to enable private parties to pursue their private
claims. Nothing in the case precludes the pardoning of civil
offenses or the remittal of affiliated fines and forfeitures;
rather, the case explained that contempt findings may not be
pardoned in civil cases between private parties. Thus, there
are good reasons for believing that civil offenses are different
than the contempt orders in Ex parte Grossman.
Non-academic comments about the pardon power
likewise presume, in most instances, that only criminal
offenses may be pardoned or remitted.94
A few scholars, by contrast, have reached the conclusion
espoused by this Article. Some of them offer little to no

91. Morison, supra note 61, at 278 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, Morison cites
cases repeating Chief Justice Marshall’s conclusory dictum from Wilson. See id.
at 296, 296-97 nn.208-09.
92. Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99
YALE L.J. 341, 371 (1989).
93. Id. (citing Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925)).
94. For example, a Washington Post article dismisses the theory that President
Obama could use the pardon power to help illegal immigrants, because unlawful
presence is “a civil violation, not a criminal one.” Suzy Khimm, No, Obama Can’t
Grant ‘Amnesty’ by Pardoning Illegal Immigrants, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/no-obama-cant-grantamnesty-by-pardoning-illegal-immigrants/2011/12/06/gIQA5S53ZO_blog.html.
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support for their conclusion.95 Others offer slightly more
evidence for their position but, as shown in the following
paragraphs, do not explore the array of historical materials
that would support their conclusion.
Notably, W.H. Humbert—relied upon by several
subsequent scholars as suggesting that civil offenses may be
pardoned—offered little if any support for this view in his
excellent 1941 exposition on the pardon power. First,
Humbert wrote, “The Court [in The Laura96] did not question
the right of the President to remit, through the exercise of his
power to grant pardons, fines and forfeitures of every
description which arise under the laws of Congress.”97 The
phrase that Humbert chose—“of every description”—could be
construed as applying to civil offenses as well as criminal
offenses. But it is unclear that he intended as much. First, he
cites almost no historical evidence for his conclusion (just a
single legal encyclopedia). Second, The Laura involved a
criminal offense, not a civil one, and did not evaluate whether
civil offenses may be pardoned; if Chief Justice Marshall’s
dictum in United States v. Wilson98 suggests (without proving
the matter) that civil offenses may not be pardoned, The
Laura plays the same role in suggesting, without proof, that
civil offenses are pardonable. Third, Humbert notes that
there exists a “concurrent power of remission by the
President and by the Secretary of the Treasury of penalties
incurred for violations of the revenue laws.”99 But that power
was given by Congress to the Secretary of the Treasury on
March 3, 1797. Thus, that act of “clemency” was issued

95. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: GOVERNMENT
STRUCTURE § 38:27 (3d ed. 2011) (“The pardoning power extends not only to
felonies and misdemeanors with imprisonment but also to the remission of fines,
penalties, and forfeitures. The power to pardon should not be limited by
distinctions between ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’ penalties; property which has been
seized by the government can be restored so long as third-party interests in the
property have not vested.”).
96. 114 U.S. 411, 417 (1885).
97. HUMBERT, supra note 42, at 51-52 (emphasis added).
98. 23 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
99. HUMBERT, supra note 42, at 52.
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pursuant to a statutory authorization to cancel penalties.100
Whether or not Congress may authorize an agency to settle
specific cases does prove that the president may, under the
inherent authority vested in him by Article II, pardon this
sort of violation of the law.101 Thus, Humbert offered an
ambiguous hint—with no analysis—that civil offenses may
be pardoned.
Subsequent scholars who share this Article’s conclusion
have relied on Humbert’s unclear comment. For example,
Harold Krent observes that “the [pardon] Clause covers civil
as well as criminal sanctions imposed by the federal
government.”102 But to support this claim, he offers no
analysis. He instead cites only pages 51-52 of Humbert’s
book,103 which (as just shown)104 failed to assess this point
thoroughly.
Like Krent, Brian Kalt suggested that “[a] pardon can
release the offender from civil liability as to the federal
government, provided that the claims of third parties are not
impaired.”105 But he also cites only Humbert’s work—which,
as just noted, provides almost no evidence for its conclusion
other than a citation to an ambiguous Supreme Court case.106
Like Krent’s and Kalt’s work, William Duker suggested
that, while the pardon power does not apply to civil suits
generally, the executive may have the power to pardon civil
100. Remission Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 13, 1 Stat. 506 (1797); United States
v. Lancaster, 26 F. Cas. 859, 860-61 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 15,557) (“That the
power of remission vested in the secretary of the treasury [by Congress, not by
Article II] extends to such a case, and that, where so exercised, the interest of an
individual in the penalty, not consummated by judgment, may be defeated, is
unquestionable.”) (emphasis added).
101. Lancaster, 26 F. Cas. at 860 (“But this case does not decide the question
whether the president can, by his pardon, defeat the inchoate right of a private
person, in a case where the remedy for the recovery of the penalty or forfeiture
can be prosecuted only by and in the name of the United States.”).
102. Krent, supra note 30, at 1673 (emphasis added) (citing HUMBERT, supra
note 42).
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 97-101.
105. Kalt, supra note 33, at 780 n.10 (emphasis added).
106. See id. (citing HUMBERT, supra note 42).
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penalties when doing so would not affect the rights or
benefits of a third party.107 But in substantiating this claim,
Duker cites only a single source—an English case that was
decided more than a century before the pardon power became
a presidential power.108 So his analysis, though correct, did
not explore the state of the pardon power at the Founding.
And as shown in Part III, there is a great deal of additional
evidence that illuminates the constitutional validity of
remitting civil penalties or pardoning civil offenders.
Only one scholar undertook more than a cursory review
of whether civil offenses may be pardoned—but his analysis,
too, addresses only a small fraction of the available evidence.
Saikrishna Prakash’s treatment provides the most detailed
analysis ever undertaken (until now) of whether civil offenses
may be pardoned. Prakash correctly concludes that the
pardon power applies to civil offenses, but his exploration of
the subject—he devotes five paragraphs to this issue in a
2015 book109 and two more in a 2005 article110—falls short of
true exposition. First, Prakash cites two other works to
substantiate his claim.111 The first is the work of Humbert
(who, as shown above, did not address in detail whether civil
offenses may be pardoned and did not build a case for that
conclusion). Second, Prakash cited a 1984 book by Edward
107. William F. Duker, The President’s Power To Pardon: A Constitutional
History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 526 (1977) (“[I]f a suit was for the king’s
branch of a law only and not to the particular damage of any third party, the king
could pardon or dispense; if the suit was not only for the king’s benefit but for the
profit or safety of a third person, the king could not release the party.”).
108. Id. at 526 n.262 (citing Thomas v. Sorrell, 89 Eng. Rep. 63, 100 (1673)).
Duker also cites U.S. cases from 1875 and 1877. Id. at 526 n.264 (citing Knote v.
United States, 95 U.S. 149 (1877); Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474 (1875)).
Duker’s authorities do not prove the state of the law at the Founding.
Additionally, the remittals that he cites arose out of criminal statutes. See Knote,
95 U.S. at 149; Osborn, 91 U.S. at 474, 477. Even though they were civil actions,
they were the enforcement provisions of criminal, not civil offenses.
109. SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 104-05 (2015).

THE

BEGINNING: THE

110. Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 582
& n.356 (2005) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; id. amend. V).
111. Id. at 582 n.355 (citing EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE
POWERS, 1787-1984 (5th ed. 1984); HUMBERT, supra note 42, at 51-53).
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Corwin to support his conclusions.112 But Corwin merely
stated that regardless of whether “the penalty takes the form
of a fine or forfeiture, a pardon by the President restores to
the offender so much of his property as has not become vested
in third parties or covered into the Treasury.”113 That
statement does not assert, much less prove, that the pardon
power reaches civil offenses; Corwin could be discussing only
criminal offenses that impose fines or permit forfeiture.
(Dozens of treatises and cases from around the Founding
observe that the president or an English monarch could
pardon fines and forfeitures, so if Corwin’s statement
resolves the question posed by this Article, then far-better
sources exist to support the same result). So neither Humbert
nor Corwin makes Prakash’s case for him.
But unlike other scholars to consider the availability of
civil pardons, Prakash engaged in some original analysis on
the subject.
In his 2005 article, Prakash employed a plain-text reading
of the word “offences” in the pardon power. He assumed that
the word “offence” means the same thing each time that it
was used in the Constitution and that it means something
different than “crime” (since that word appears elsewhere in
the Constitution).114 Hence, in Prakash’s view “[w]hether an
offense is designated criminal or civil is immaterial, for, in
either case, someone has committed an offense against the
laws of the United States.”115 But he assumes away the puzzle
of whether “offences” and “crimes” were used in
distinguishable ways; other scholars simply applied the
opposite assumption.116 As shown in Part III, the textual
evidence is ambiguous, and Prakash’s discussion omits any
assessment of the history of pardons—what monarchs,
presidents, and governors actually did—even though the
Supreme Court regularly consults “[t]he history of our
executive pardoning power,” and particularly “the English
112. Id.
113. CORWIN, supra note 111, at 189.
114. See Prakash, supra note 110, at 582 n.356.
115. Id. at 582.
116. PRAKASH, supra note 109, at 104-05.
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common-law practice” when determining the scope of the
Pardon Clause.117 History is the best evidence that presidents
may pardon civil offenses, and this Article explores below
(also in Part III) the historical evidence about civil clemency
in vastly greater detail than any prior assessment.
Prakash returned to the question of civil pardons in his
2015 book, wherein he observed that the phrase “‘[o]ffenses
against the United States’ [in Article II] should be
understood as encompassing any violation of federal law in
which public interests predominate,” including “civil offenses
prosecutable by the government.”118 He added that:
[w]hen the government sues to collect fines and forfeitures, it
prosecutes to redress offenses against the United States. In these
situations, the president may pardon any such fines and forfeitures.
Put another way, it does not matter whether Congress designates
some penalty, fine, or forfeiture as ‘civil’ rather than ‘criminal.’119

In all such situations, Prakash observed, “[t]he president can
remit any fine or forfeiture due the United States; the fact
that such a penalty accrues to the United States indicates
that someone has committed an offense against the nation.”120
Prakash is right. So are Krent, Kalt, Duker, and
Humbert. But among the dozen or so scholars to address this
issue—and Chief Justices Marshall and Taft in their dictum,
and the Department of Justice in its policy—no one has yet
delved below the somewhat superficial arguments revisited
above. No one, in short, has yet proven the case. Thus, the
academic debate of whether the president may pardon civil
offenses remains open, and no robust effort has been made to
disprove the Supreme Court’s stray observation that pardons
apply only to crimes. And the debate should be hotter than it
has been: the limited number of voices in the discussion
arises from an apparent oversight of the potential
implications of a civil clemency power.

117. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 262 (1974).
118. PRAKASH, supra note 109, at 105.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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III. MAY CIVIL OFFENSES BE PARDONED?
This Article turns now to its central topic. Numerous
interpretative tools, explored in this Part, suggest strongly
that presidential clemency is available for civil offenses. Part
III.A evaluates evidence from before the Constitutional
Convention that illuminates whether civil offenses may be
pardoned. It explores the history of pardons in England and
in the early colonies, showing that monarchs and colonial
governors pardoned what would today be civil offenses. Part
III.B examines what happened at the Constitutional
Convention. It explores the national debate over the pardon
power, textual clues from various drafts of the pardon power
about the scope of that power, and intratextual clues about
the meaning of the word “offenses” in Article II. Part III.C,
evaluates extrinsic evidence contemporaneous to the
Convention. Part III.D discusses the structural and policy
grounds supporting the conclusion that civil offenses may be
pardoned. The above interpretive tools track the leading
methodological approaches relied on by the Supreme Court
to construe the scope of the pardon power.121
A. Evidence from Before the Constitutional Convention:
English Pardons and Early U.S. and Colonial Pardons
As noted in the Introduction, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly indicated that history is indispensable in
assessing the pardon power’s meaning and breadth.122
Historical evidence from England further matters because
Alexander Hamilton intended, as he expressed in Federalist
121. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118 (1925) (“We think the arguments
drawn from the common law, from the power of the King under the British
Constitution, which plainly was the prototype of this clause, from the legislative
history of the clause in the Convention, and from the ordinary meaning of its
words, are much more relevant and convincing.”).
122. See id. at 109-10 (“[T]he language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted
safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they
were when the instrument was framed and adopted.”); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 307, 311 (1855) (“[T]he language used in the Constitution, conferring the
power to grant reprieves and pardons, must be construed with reference to its
meaning at the time of its adoption.”). For examples of this strategy, see Schick
v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 262 (1974); Ex Parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 311-12.
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No. 69, that the pardon power would “resemble equally that
of the King of Great Britain and of the governor of New
York.”123
1. Practice of English Monarchs
So does English history suggest that the U.S. pardon
power encompasses the power to pardon civil offenses? Yes.
But before considering this evidence, this Section considers
several reasons that the evidence, though strong, is not even
more overwhelming. Four problems make it difficult to
achieve perfect clarity in this area.
First, statutes were not denominated as either criminal
or civil offenses during this period—a practice of legislative
ambiguity that, even today, has not vanished. 124 Offenses
only became “civil” much later.125 Indeed, not until 1943 did
the Supreme Court definitively hold that Congress could
supplement criminal penalties with “remedial” civil fines
that exceeded the amount of the government’s injury.126 The
fact that England’s Parliament and early American colonies
did not denominate offenses as “civil” makes it impossible to
know definitively whether kings and governors could have
pardoned civil offenses. But as will be shown, kings and
123. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, reprinted in THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS 396 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2009). Hamilton was speaking of his
draft—not the final version of Article II’s pardon power. Even so, he exhaustively
described the limited ways in which the president’s pardon power would vary
from the king’s power, and made no mention of a narrower prerogative to remit
fines. Id. at 395-98.
124. Confusion often exists about whether a statute is civil or criminal. For “civil
and non-punitive” statutes, “‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice to override
legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into
a criminal penalty.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (quoting Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)). But courts still conduct this inquiry,
which requires them to assess whether “the intention [of the legislature] was to
enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive” and to “further examine
whether the statutory scheme is ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
125. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 83 (citing cases from 1846 to 1909
as marking the rise of civil offenses in the United States).
126. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549-51 (1943).
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queens had the power to pardon offenses that would, today,
be civil offenses. And many of these English statutes are
nearly identical to modern civil offenses.127
Second, eighteenth-century pardons (and earlier
pardons) are not collected in any one searchable database,
making it hard to know exactly what kings and queens
pardoned. Multiple sources have been reviewed on multiple
continents in writing this Article, providing a large sampling
of illustrative pardons.
Third, the Crown and Parliament clashed over royal
pardons.128 Nearly all of the “general pardons” (i.e., acts of
amnesty) discussed below were approved by Parliament,
resembling the modern battle for power that occurs between
presidents and Congress.129 While thoughtful commentators
have concluded that parliamentary approval was a courtesy
designed to preserve the peace—and not a necessity130—no
definitive statement exists regarding whether the Crown
could, outside of wartime, issue general pardons cancelling
fines, debts, and other non-criminal burdens without
parliamentary approval. This Article attributes these joint
amnesties to the king or queen who approved them—but
127. Compare 6 ANTHONY HAMMOND & THOMAS COLPITTS GRANGER, A
COLLECTION OF STATUTES CONNECTED WITH THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE
LAW 218 (1836) (noting that it was an offense to dump “dung and filth of the
garbage and intrails as well of beasts killed, as of other corruptions” into the
“rivers, and other waters”), with 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2012), and United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 242-43 (1980) (holding that the penalty imposed for violations
of the Clean Water Act is civil and therefore does not trigger the constitutional
protections traditionally afforded to criminal defendants). Compare HAMMOND &
COLPITTS, supra, at 2 Geo. 2 c. 24 (prohibiting, respectively, theft of saplings and
theft of any “live or dead fence, or any post, pale, rail, stile, or gate” worth at least
two shillings), with 16 U.S.C. § 4307 (2012) (providing for civil penalties for
destroying or taking certain plants), 16 U.S.C. § 4306 (specifying offenses), and
40 U.S.C. § 9506 (civil offenses for anyone who, lacking authority to do so, “taps
or opens [certain] mains or pipes laid by the federal government”).
128. See Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power Over Pardon & Amnesty:
Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1225, 1228-29 (2003) (“[O]ver the years Parliament imposed specific
limitations on the pardon power in order to avoid perceived abuses.”).
129. Similar battles erupted between Congress and President Johnson when he
sought to declare amnesty after the Civil War. Johnson won. See id. at 1240-42.
130. Id. at 1228-29.
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readers should be mindful that Parliament approved these
mass pardons; in modern parlance, this would be akin to a
joint act of clemency by the Congress and president.
Fourth and finally, fines were payable to the Crown.
Thus, kings and queens were understandably reluctant to
remit this income—it was their money.131 In fact, as shown
below, some monarchs pushed Parliament to over-punish
certain offenses precisely so that the Crown could pull in
more revenue. Thus, there are few remittals of fines because
monarchs wanted the money and the parties enforcing these
provisions fought fiercely to collect it because they would
acquire part of any recovery.132
Despite these four obstacles, ample evidence shows that
kings and queens commuted punishments that resemble
modern civil offenses, demonstrating that they had the power
to pardon any such offense (at least on a case by case basis,
if not for a class of offenders).
An unbroken line of kings and queens pardoned offenses
that would almost undoubtedly be civil today. This discussion
reviews these pardons in the approximate order that they
were issued and shows that they occurred both before and
through the Constitutional Convention. This Article first
considers pardons in the 200 years before George III. It then
explores George III’s own pardons, which are the most
probative because they immediately preceded U.S.
Independence.
King James I (1603-25) remitted the tariffs due on
currants133 and the fine (unaccompanied by prison time) for
unlawfully attending a religious service.134 Charles I (1625-

131. See, e.g., 3 SIR EDWARD COKE, JOHN HENRY THOMAS & JOHN FARQUHAR
FRASER, THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT. [1572-1617]: IN THIRTEEN PARTS
96 (1793) [hereinafter COKE’S REPORTS].
132. NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940, at 51-75 (2013) (discussing
the role of various quasi-public servants in imposing, and receiving a portion of,
fines).
133. STANLEY MAYES, AN ORGAN FOR THE SULTAN 247-48 (1959).
134. 2 WILLIAM G. SCROGGINS, LEAVES OF A STUNTED SHRUB 386 (2009).
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49) reduced a fine, originally set at £50,000.135 In 1631, he
unilaterally “commuted” profits that he was owed under a
joint venture.136 Years later, the royal printers botched their
printing of Bibles and were fined £300.137 Charles I offered
them a conditional pardon.138 On another occasion, a lord was
found liable for using “trees set aside for the navy for their
iron works,” and Charles I reduced the massive fine of
£98,000 by more than eighty percent.139 A biography of
Charles I reports that other “[e]normous fines” for violations
related to the use of royal forests “were similarly
reduced . . . between 1636 and 1640.”140 Charles I’s policy, one
skeptic observed, appears to have been to “impose a fine
which was so large that it was certain to generate the
maximum resentment and then to remit or substantially
reduce it.”141
Following the interregnum, Charles II remitted fines for
the non-payment of fees to use government land142 and the
nonpayment of taxes for having a hearth or fireplace. 143
James II likewise pardoned what would now be civil offenses,
such as when he remitted the “alien duty on all goods
exported”144 or remitted a fine (unaccompanied by prison
time) for insulting a church.145
135. PAULINE GREGG, KING CHARLES I 99 (1981).
136. Id. at 221.
137. Id. at 248.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 225-26. The fine was presumably commuted by Charles I or his agent.
Given that the fine was reduced from £98,000 to £12,000, it is hard to imagine
anyone else would have granted this remittitur. Id.
140. Id. at 226.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. THOMAS MADOX, FIRMA BURGI, OR AN HISTORICAL ESSAY CONCERNING
CITIES TOWNS AND BURROUGHS OF ENGLAND 239-40 (1726).
143. WILLIAM O’SULLIVAN, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY
EARLIEST TIMES TO THE ACT OF UNION 113 (1937).
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144. S.J.B., A Narrative of the Sufferings Which the Jews Have Endured in
England, THE CHRISTIAN’S PENNY MAGAZINE, July 11, 1835, at 223.
145. JOHN WILLIAM WALLACE, THE REPORTERS: ARRANGED
372-73 (4th ed. 1882).
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William III and Mary II (1688-95 (jointly), 1695-1702
(William)), remitted fines due for killing deer in royal
forests,146 felling or stealing trees or fences from those
forests,147 and failing to pay taxes on the harvest (for “any
small Rectory Vicarage or Benefice” amounting to less than
£30).148 Anne (1702-14) placed restraints on colonial
governors. For instance, in 1702, she instructed Lord
Cornbury, who administered New Jersey, to “not remit any
fines or forfeitures whatsoever, above the sum of ten
pounds”—leaving him free to remit smaller amounts.149
Similar instructions were sent to other colonial governors by
Anne and by later monarchs as discussed in Part III.A.3.150
Such delegations suggest that she had a commensurate
power to remit fines—or else delegation would have been
invalid.
George I (1714-27) only pardoned offenses that would
now be civil with Parliament’s approval. For example, in
conjunction with Parliament, he pardoned fines incurred
before April 19, 1709151 and “all fines pro Licentia
Concordandi”152 below £6.153 George II (1727-60) mimicked his
predecessors. Although some commentators suggest that
George II exercised his pardon power narrowly, they
146. 2 W. & M. c. 10, reprinted in 6 STATUTES OF THE REALM 176 (1963). A
subsequent pardon appears to have gone further, removing any deer killing
violations from the pardon’s exemptions. In other words, all fines and penalties
for hunting royal deer were pardoned. See id. at 607.
147. Id. at 176.
148. Id. This fine recurred in the subsequent pardon in the mid-1690s. See id.
at 610. The language is ambiguous as to whether the exemption applies to
harvests worth less than £30 or to taxes owed on that harvest that equal less than
£30.
149. 2 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY
JERSEY 506, 516 (William A. Whitehead ed. 1881).

OF THE

STATE

OF

NEW

150. See 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS 1670-1776, at
330-31 (Leonard Woods Labaree ed., 1935).
151. 3 Geo. 1 c. 29, reprinted in ANNO GEORGII REGIS, MAGNA BRITANNIA,
FRANCIA, & HIBERNIA SEPTIMO 560-61 (1721).
152. See Licentia Concordandi, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)
(defining “licentia concordandi” as “[o]ne of the proceedings on levying a fine of
lands”).
153. 20 Geo. 2 c. 52, reprinted in ANNO GEORGII REGIS, supra note 151, at 561.
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mistakenly rely on the number of crimes canceled (few)
rather than the number of non-criminal offenses (many).154
George II (again, with Parliament’s backing) canceled fines
payable to the Exchequer or sheriffs and other officials that
arose prior to July 24, 1721,155 as well as any “Fines and
Amerciaments, returned, [assessed], taxed, set or entered in
any Court of Record within this Realm of Great Britain”
before June 15, 1745.156 But in fairness, available records fail
to support that George I or II continued their predecessors’
custom of pardoning non-criminal fines unilaterally—
without Parliament’s blessing.
But George III (1760-1820), against whom the American
colonists rebelled, resumed this tradition—and his practices
are especially indicative of what sort of pardons the founders
would have been aware of—since they lived through his
reign. He pardoned offenses that would probably now be civil,
such as the £100 fine that was imposed when William White
was found to have run an unlawful cockpit (for gambling,
presumably),157
damaging
a
water-mill,158
and
“[c]ompounding an offense against the turnpike roads.”159 He
also pardoned people for convincing a glassmaker to leave the
kingdom (1784),160 falsifying a certificate to permit the
release of foreign brandy (presumably from the forfeiture of
154. See, e.g., WILLIAM CONWAY KEELE, THE PROVINCIAL JUSTICE, OR
MAGISTRATE’S MANUAL, BEING A COMPLETE DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, AND A
COMPENDIOUS AND GENERAL VIEW OF THE PROVINCIAL LAW 341 (1835) (referring to
the amnesty in 20 Geo. 2 c. 52 (1746), as reaching “certain crimes, committed
before a certain period” even though the amnesty also applied to various purely
monetary fines and debts) (emphasis added).
155. 20 Geo. 2 c. 52, reprinted in ANNO GEORGII REGIS, supra note 151, at 561.
156. Id.
157. 4 CALENDAR OF HOME OFFICE PAPERS
1775, at 536 (1899).

OF THE

REIGN

OF

GEORGE III 1773-

158. Id. at 532.
159. Id. at 541 (pardon of Matthew Concanen); see also id. at 543 (“uttering a
bad shilling,” which means giving counterfeit money as change, apparently with
or without intent); id. at 295 (“Pardon for entering the Spanish Military service.”).
160. 304 LIST AND INDEX SOC’Y, PARDONS AND PUNISHMENTS: JUDGES’ REPORTS ON
CRIMINALS, 1783 TO 1830: HO (HOME OFFICE) 47, at 17 (2004) (discussing the 1784
pardon of Henry Gould) [hereinafter PARDONS AND PUNISHMENTS].
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customs officials) (1787),161 unionization by wheelwrights
(1787),162 buggery (1787),163 exporting two bags of wool
improperly (1787),164 and for performing acts that were
criminal at the time but could now be civil, such as
solemnizing a marriage without proper licensing165 and
killing or stealing various animals166 (which could today be
both a criminal offense and a civil offense).167 George III’s use
of clemency applied to acts that would now be civil offenses
rather than crimes.168
In addition to what English monarchs actually pardoned,
many other laws closely resemble today’s civil offenses.169 And
161. 305 id. at 340 (2005) (discussing the pardon of James Leslie).
162. Id. at ii (citing HO 47/7/95, folios 396-399).
163. Id. at 224 (discussing the pardon of Hugh Gribble).
164. Id. at 244 (discussing the pardon of John Wannberg).
165. Id. at 385 (discussing the pardon of this conviction of Alexander Thomson
for what was then, admittedly, a felony). Such an action would now be a civil
offense. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-6 (2016) (“No minister, officer, or any other
person authorized to solemnize a marriage under the laws of this State shall
perform a ceremony of marriage between a man and woman, or shall declare them
to be husband and wife, until there is delivered to that person a license for the
marriage of the said persons.”).
166. 305 PARDONS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 160, at 232 (discussing the
pardons of Thomas Gilbert and Williams Jenkins for stealing mares); id. at 236
(stealing a gamecock, and noting that the “offence [was] trifling”); id. (stealing a
lamb); id. at 243 (stealing “a turkey and other fowl”); id. at 247 (stealing a hen);
id. at 252 (maiming a cow with an axe).
167. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (2012) (imposing both civil and criminal penalties for
killing animals belonging to an endangered species).
168. This evidence, of course is not dispositive. The violations of the law that
the Crown pardoned were crimes. But, as noted repeatedly, there were no civil
offenses at the time.
169. See generally supra note 127 (juxtaposing English laws and modern U.S.
laws). Many modern civil offenses are public nuisances (e.g., harming air, water,
or other aspects of the environment), and the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that the regal pardon power encompassed a power to remit fines for such
nuisances. Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 311 (1855).
The following additional examples all come from the period when George III
reigned—the most relevant period for determining what offenses that would now
be civil could have been pardoned by the Crown. Compare HAMMOND & GRANGER,
supra note 127, at 219 (imposing fine for operating an inn without a license), with
D.C. CODE § 47-2853.29 (2016) (permitting civil fines to be imposed for failing to
acquire proper licenses in the District of Columbia); compare 4 SIR JOHN COMYNS
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as shown in the next two Sections, English monarchs could
undisputedly have pardoned any of them.
2. Common Law
As we just saw, pardons of purely monetary offenses were
regularly granted by English monarchs—and they could have
gone further. English common law—which, to reiterate, the
Supreme Court has found vital to assessing the pardon
power170 confirms this conclusion. Multiple cases confirmed
that English kings and queens could pardon nearly any
monetary penalty, so long as the rights of private parties
were not impaired. In England, fines were paid to the Clerk
of the King’s Silver171 or to the Exchequer, and these fines and

& STEWART KYD, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 646 (4th ed. 1793)
[hereinafter DIGEST OF THE LAWS] (imposing fines on county officials who failed to
submit quarterly reports about efforts to help criminals and beggars), with 46
U.S.C. § 3507(h)(1)(A) (2012) (imposing civil penalties for failing to provide
quarterly updates about cruise passengers under 46 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(3)(A)(ii)(iv)); compare DIGEST OF THE LAWS, supra, at 700 (fining jurors who refused “to be
sworn”), with 28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (2012) (imposing a fine of up to $1000 for a
person who disregards a jury summons). See also DIGEST OF THE LAWS, supra, at
350-51 (imposing a fine for failing to become a knight, if offered by the Crown,
after inheriting £40 per year or more); id. at 648 (imposing fines on lords who
collected rent from a newly erected cottage on his lands); id. at 559 (imposing a
fine of five times the value of the sum lost or won if a gambler wagered £10 or
more); id. at 291 (imposing a fine on anyone who married an orphan under age 21
without the license of the mayor and alderman); id. at 553 (fining an “innholder
[if he] make horse bread, a baker being in the town, or sell not the same, and his
oats, provender, hay, and victuals both for man and beast at reasonable prices”);
HAMMOND & GRANGER, supra note 127, at 175-76 (imposing a fine for exporting
equipment for “preparing, working up, or finishing” cotton or linen); id. at 219
(imposing a fine for advertising that a reward would be paid with “no questions
asked” for the return of lost or stolen items); id. at 192 (fining a sheriff, mayor, or
bailiff who admitted a voter to a polling place before administering a proper oath
or affirmation); id. at 230 (imposing a fine for overcharging for wine).
170. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
171. See 1 JOHN HARRIS, LEXICON TECHNICUM: OR, AN UNIVERSAL ENGLISH
DICTIONARY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES (3d ed. 1716) (defining “Clerk of the King’s
Silver” as “an Officer belonging to the Common-Pleas, to whom every Fine is
brought, after it has been with the Cuftos Brevium, and by whom the Effect of the
Writ of Covenant is entered into a Paper-Book, and according to that Note, all the
Fines of that Term are also Recorded in the Rolls of the Court”) (first emphasis
added). The Office of the King’s Silver played the same role in the years before
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payments wound up in the king’s hands unless he transferred
his rights to some other party.172 Thus, intuition suggests,
and case law confirms, that the king was empowered to
cancel these payments.173 In 1602, in Tey’s Case, Lord Coke
confirmed the King’s absolute right to such revenues.174
Common law confirmed over the following century that
this prerogative included the power to remit fines and
monetary penalties generally. For example, a 1673 case,
Thomas v. Sorrell, confirmed that although the king’s pardon
power was limited in its ability to impair third-party rights,
no such limitations curtailed his power to pardon or remit
monies due to the Crown.175 Another judge during this era
wrote that if a “fine . . . came to the king’s coffers, . . . the
king might pardon it.”176 Similarly, a case from 1686 stated
“where a man ought to repair a bridge [and is fined for not
doing so], the king can pardon . . . the fine due to himself.”177
The same source added that “the king may pardon, or free
from a pecuniary mulct . . . [i.e., a fine for a petty offense].”178
Yet another put the matter simply and definitively: “the king
pardoned all that belonged to him, which the king may
and after the Constitution was ratified. See 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 209
(1771) (noting that “every fine is brought” to the Clerk of the King’s Silver).
172. See 1 EDWARD WOOD, A COMPLETE BODY OF CONVEYANCING: IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 215 (1792) (noting that fines are “due to the king”); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS,
A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 553 (6th ed. 1787) (similar).
173. See Ex parte Rice, 162 S.W. 891, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913) (“[T]he king is
the prosecutor of all offenders against the criminal laws of the realm, and in his
name all actions are brought. It was then perfectly consistent in theory that the
king could, by means of a pardon, remit any punishment due to public justice, or
any fine or forfeiture which he himself would otherwise receive.”).
174. COKE’S REPORTS, supra note 131, at 80.
175. See RICHARD FREEMAN, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE
COURTS OF KING’S BENCH & COMMON PLEAS FROM 1670 TO 1704, at 138 (2d ed,
1826).
176. T. B. HOWELL, 1 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND
PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 775 (1816).
177. 11 id. at 1311.
178. Id. (“[T]hough the king may pardon, or free from a pecuniary mulct before
the occasion happen, yet he cannot pardon or discharge the trespass itself: an
instance is given in voluntary escapes.”).
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dispose of to whom he will; to the party, if he pleases.”179 And
another concluded that “[i]f a Statute directs a Penalty
incurred by the Commission of an Offence to be divided
between the King and the Poor of the Parish, the King can
only dispense with his own part of the Penalty.”180 Common
law from the seventeenth-century thus shows that monarchs
could dispense with their share of a penalty.181
Eighteenth-century case law confirmed this principle. In
1702, Dr. Groenvelt’s Case addressed a dispute that involved
monetary liability and possible jail time on the offender: the
case involved a negligent doctor. Dr. Groenvelt’s Case
confirmed that the king’s broad prerogative to pardon applied
to non-criminal offenses.182 The court held that the king could
not renounce his right to pardon and that the king could use
his pardon power to remit a fine even when a private thirdparty was the beneficiary of the fine.183
The court explained that any fine could be pardoned by
the king because “although the fine belongs to a subject by
179. Id. at 774. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “mulct” as “[a] fine
imposed for an offence,” or occasionally, “a compulsory payment, a tax, esp. an
unfair
or
arbitrary
one.”
Mulct,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com.
180. 34 HOWELL, supra note 176, at 223 (1828).
181. See also Godden v. Hales (1696), reprinted in 11 A COMPLETE COLLECTION
STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS 1166 (T.B. Howell & R. Bagshaw eds. 1811).
OF

182. Dr. Groenvelt’s Case (1702) 91 Eng. Rep. 1038-39. Notably, the pardoned
fine, for unintentional medical malpractice, did not arise from a criminal offense.
See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent:
The Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 438 n.64
(2006) (“Battery in the medical malpractice context is generally considered a tort,
rather than a criminal act.”). The court appears to have lacked the vocabulary to
describe quite what this fine was. To be sure, the court described the case as “a
sort of criminal proceeding.” Dr. Groenvelt’s Case, 91 Eng. Rep. at 1039 (emphasis
added). But the court explained that the case was “a great misdemeanor and
offence at common law,” id., showing that the meaning of the word “offence” is
broader than that of the word “crime.” This distinction matters, of course, because
the Pardon Clause lets the president pardon “offences,” not merely “crimes.” Thus,
Dr. Groenvelt’s Case shows that the executive can pardon a civil offense in which
a failure to comply with a duty, without malice, leads to liability. This principle
reaches thousands of federal civil offenses.
183. Dr. Groenvelt’s Case (1702) 91 Eng. Rep. at 1038.

2016]

PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY

697

the King’s grant, as in this case to the College of Physicians;
yet the King by pardon of the offence before the fine is set,
may in like manner pardon the fine.”184
This principle remained valid as of the Constitution’s
ratifications—as confirmed by treatises. The king’s power to
pardon purely monetary offenses was confirmed in 1787 by a
leading legal treatise published by William Hawkins.
Hawkins concluded that it was a “settled rule” that “the king
may pardon any offence whatever, whether against the
common or statute law.”185 He cited favorably several of the
cases just discussed and noted no contrary, intervening case
law.186 The Hawkins treatise was “the edition nearest to the
date of the Constitution’s framing” and “widely read,”187 and
has been relied on, repeatedly, by the Supreme Court. 188
Additionally, Alexander Hamilton, who was the most
influential of the Founders in drafting the Pardon Clause,
appears to have owned a copy.189 It is reasonable to attribute
184. Id.
185. HAWKINS, supra note 172, at 553 (emphasis added).
186. HAWKINS, supra note 172, at 553 § 33 ([T]he king may pardon any offence
whatever, whether against the common or statute law, . . . after it is over [and]
that a pardon of such offence will save the party from any fine for the time
precedent to the pardon.”). Cf. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 74,
supra note 123, at 427-29 (observing that the president may need to issue
immediate pardons to induce law-breakers to stop their ongoing unlawful
conduct).
187. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 331 (2001); see also David
Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel into
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 162 (2001) (referring
to Hawkins as a “legal commentator read widely by eighteenth-century
practitioners in the common law”).
188. The Supreme Court has relied on Hawkins’s treatise in a variety of
contexts, including for its exposition about the pardon power. See, e.g., S. Union
Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2353 (2012) (pardons); District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (right of religious officials to possess arms in
seventeenth century England); Atwater, 532 U.S. at 331-32 (arrest without a
warrant); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 712 n.10 (1997) (whether
suicide is murder).
189. See Jeremy Dibbell, Alexander Hamilton’s Library, PHILOBIBLIOS (Dec. 22,
2009), http://philobiblos.blogspot.com/2009/12/alexander-hamiltons-library.html
(noting that the author reviewed records to discern which books Hamilton owned);
Alexander Hamilton, LIBR. THING, http://www.librarything.com/catalog/
AlexanderHamiltonI/yourlibrary. Even assuming that Hamilton owned a copy,
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this broad view of the law—as well as the common law
tradition just discussed—to the Founders’ choice to use
“offence” rather than “crime” in the Pardon Clause. The next
Section substantiates that such attribution is supported by
what colonial governors did and by the Constitutional
Convention.
3. Pre-Constitution Gubernatorial Pardons
The last two sub-parts suggest that even though purely
monetary offenses in England were not denominated as
“civil” offenses, kings and queens could and did pardon those
offenses. This Section shows that colonial governors had a
similar power to pardon civil offenses and to remit the fines
and that governors in five states (including New York) had
this power during the early republic.
Colonial governors pardoned fines and forfeitures or had
the power to do so—without that power being limited to
either civil or criminal cases—long before the Constitutional
Convention.190 This power existed throughout most (if not all)
of the British Empire.191 Colonial governors in the Bahamas,
Barbados, Bermuda, Grenada, Jamaica, Leeward Islands,
and Nova Scotia were authorized to remit fines of up to £10,
and governors in other colonies evidently had the same
power.192
however, it is possible that he only acquired it after he prepared his draft of the
Pardon Clause.
190. Duker, supra note 107, at 498-99 (noting that “[t]he Lord Proprietors of
North Carolina were given power ‘to remit, release, pardon and abolish (whether
before judgments or after) all crimes and offences whatsoever’ . . . [and] [t]he
constitution gave the proprietors’ court the power to mitigate all fines and to
suspend all executions in criminal causes before or after sentence”).
191. HUMBERT, supra note 42, at 12 (“[E]ach colony at some time during its
history enjoyed, through delegation, the benefits of the royal prerogative of
pardon.”).
192. See id. at 12-13 (citing EVARTS BOUTELL GREENE, THE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNOR IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA 125 (1898)). See also,
DONALD FYSON, MAGISTRATES, POLICE AND PEOPLE: EVERYDAY CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
QUEBEC AND LOWER CANADA 266 (2006) (“[T]he governor, as the king’s
representative, could . . . remit corporal punishment, imprisonment, or the king’s
share of fines.”) (emphasis added).
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The same principle held true in the American Colonies.
For example, the colonial administrator of New Jersey
expressly had the power in 1676 to pardon fines for minor
offenses, without limitation.193 This power was only slightly
curtailed (to fall into line with the approach in other colonies)
when the administrator of New Jersey was instructed by the
Crown in 1702 to “not remit any fines or forfeitures
whatsoever, above the sum of ten pounds.”194 Other colonial
governors in the Americas had similar powers,195 including
the power to “remit fines . . . as they saw fit.”196
Likewise, in 1774, King George III delegated to Thomas
Gage, commander-in-chief of the British forces in North
America, the power “to remit fines and forfeitures, to such
offenders as should appear to be fit objects of mercy.”197
A commensurate power rested with England’s colonial
governor in the individual colonies: as of September 1775, as
193. THE CHARTER OR FUNDAMENTAL LAWS, OF WEST NEW JERSEY, AGREED
UPON—1676, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES,
NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2551 (Francis
Newton Thorpe ed. 1909) (providing that the administrator “have full power to
forgive and remit the person or persons offending against him or herself only, as
well before as after judgment, and condemnation, and pardon and remit the
sentence, fine and punishment of the person or persons offending, be it personal
or other whatsoever”).
194. SAMUEL SMITH, THE HISTORY
JERSEY 241 (1765).

OF THE

COLONY

OF

NOVA CÆSARIA,

OR

NEW

195. See, e.g., HUMBERT, supra note 42, at 13 nn.32-33 (citing examples from
Massachusetts and Virginia in the 1770s).
196. E.g., Krent, supra note 30, at 1672 (“Although there was some variation
from colony to colony, the governors could remit fines or exonerate convicted
criminals as they saw fit. For instance, the colonial charter in Maryland vested
the executive with the authority ‘to Remit, Release, Pardon, and Abolish all
Crimes and Offences whatsoever against such Laws whether before, or after
Judgment passed.’”) (quoting CHRISTEN JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE
AMERICAN STATES 5 (1922)).
197. 1 ROBERT SCOTT, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND; DURING THE REIGN OF GEORGE
III 439 (1824) (“General Gage, commander-in-chief in America, was appointed
governor of Massachuset’s [sic] Bay . . . . The general was farther invested with
full powers to grant pardons and to remit fines and forfeitures, to such offenders
as should appear to be fit objects of mercy . . . .”). Indeed, this grant was made in
1774, id., suggesting that George III viewed the need to lighten financial penalties
as a valuable tool to suppress unrest in the colonies.
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the Revolution drew near, one commentator noted that, for
women fined in Pennsylvania, “it is a generally received
Opinion, that the Governor Remits the Fine of the Woman in
case of Fornication.”198 These sexual offenses did not involve
prostitution; nothing occurred that would today be a crime.199
After the Revolution ended in 1783, distrust of executive
power caused the new states to curtail executive clemency
power.200 Nevertheless, most scholars agree that governors
still had a significant role in nearly half the states201: “six
states allowed their governors to invoke clemency powers
only upon the consent of an executive board, one state gave
the entire power to the legislature, and five states gave their
governors full control.”202 Numerous scholars have noted that
“[t]he executive pardon power was thus somewhat moribund
in America when it came time to write the Federal

198. G. S. Rowe, The Role of Courthouses in the Lives of Eighteenth-Century
Pennsylvania Women, 68 W. PA. HIST. MAG. 5, 17 (1985).
199. Id. at 15 (noting that one particular fine was remitted, albeit in that
particular case by a court rather than a governor, for a woman who invoked her
“weakness for uniformed men and the lack of single men in Pittsburgh”).
200. See Fowler, supra note 72, at 1654 (“[N]ew state constitutions described
different approaches to the pardon power, influenced by recent experiences
with . . . a too-powerful monarch.”); Eric R. Johnson, Doe v. Nelson: The Wrongful
Assumption of Gubernatorial Plenary Authority over the Pardoning Process, 50
S.D. L. REV. 156, 169 n.120 (2005).
201. See Johnson, supra note 200, at 169 n.120; see also Kobil, supra note 66, at
589-90 (“By the time the Constitution was drafted in 1787, . . . [t]he pardoning
power was exercised solely by the governor only in New York, Delaware,
Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina”). No evidence suggests that
purely monetary fines ceased falling within the scope of gubernatorial pardon
powers in states that continued to vest clemency powers in governors.
202. See Johnson, supra note 200.
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Constitution,”203 although opposition to executive clemency
had begun to wane.204
The aversion to giving meaningful power to the executive
soon ebbed, largely because of the fecklessness of the
executive created by the Articles of Confederation. As one
scholar described this backlash, “with the increasing calls for
a stronger central government and a stronger chief executive
after the failure of the Articles, support mounted for a strong
federal clemency power much like that of England,” and
gubernatorial pardon powers influenced the Framers’ views
of the appropriate level of presidential pardon power.205 And
at one point or another, all of the states or colonies afforded
their governors the power to remit fines and forfeitures.206
203. Kalt, supra note 33, at 785; see also Fowler, supra note 72, at 1654 (“These
experiences permeated the debates at the Constitutional Convention.”); Kobil,
supra note 66, at 590 (“[T]he Revolution ushered in a period of distrust of strong
executive authority and temporarily brought to an end the executive’s clemency
monopoly.”); Ashley M. Steiner, Remission of Guilt or Removal of Punishment?
The Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 46 Emory L.J. 959 (1997) (“After the
Revolution, though, the general distrust of executive authority which led to the
adoption of the Articles of Confederation also brought an end to the executive’s
monopoly on the clemency power.”).
204. Patrick R. Cowlishaw, Note, The Conditional Presidential Pardon, 28
STAN. L. REV. 149, 164 n.84 (1975) (“[O]pinion had shifted by the time of the
Constitutional Convention, with some states already returning greater powers to
their governors.”).
205. Jerry Carannante, What to Do About the Executive Clemency Power in the
Wake of the Clinton Presidency, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 325, 330 (2003); see also
Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A
Legal Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 21718 (1999) (“While the Framers were putting the constitutional framework in
order, they looked at restrictions on the governors in the various colonies.”).
206. Here, in reverse-chronological order, are the sources of this power for state
and colonial governors: South Carolina (1790), State v. Williams, 10 S.C.L. 26, 2627 (1 Nott & McC.) (1817); New Hampshire (1784), 4 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 2464 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed. 1909); Massachusetts (1780), 3 id. at
1901-02; Georgia (1777), 2 id. at 781; New York (1777), 5 id. at 2632-33; Delaware
(1776), 1 id. at 563; Maryland (1776), 3 id. at 1696; New Jersey (1776), 5 id. at
2596; North Carolina (1776), id. at 2791-92; Pennsylvania (1776), id. at 3087-88;
Virginia (1776), 7 id. at 3817; Rhode Island (1663), 6 id. at 3215; Connecticut
(1662), 1 id. at 534.
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B. Evidence from the Constitutional Convention
This Section assesses the meaning of the Pardon Clause
by analyzing records from the Constitutional Convention
(and related evidence of what the Pardon Clause originally
meant). This Section focuses predominantly on the
Constitution’s text about the pardon power, as well as the
process by which this language was adopted.
For the convenience of readers, here again are the words
of the Pardon Clause: “The President . . . shall have Power to
grant Reprieves207 and Pardons for Offences against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”208 This
Section focuses on nuanced differences between “Offences”
and other words such as “crimes,” but it focuses just as closely
on how carefully particular Founders—including Hamilton,
who drafted the final version of Article II’s pardon power—
differentiated among words like “crimes,” “offenses,”
“felonies,” and other related words.
This investigation begins with the first version of what
would later become the Pardon Clause. It was submitted for
the Founders’ consideration on May 29, 1787, by Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina.209 Pinckney’s draft proposed to
give presidents the “power to grant pardons and reprieves,
except in impeachments.”210 In other words, neither “offence”
nor “crime” appeared in the original draft of the pardon
power. The absence of either word suggests that any penalty
could be pardoned other than impeachments—presumably
including non-criminal violations of federal law (i.e., civil
offenses). Or—to be more precise—the fact that presidents
would, under Pinckney’s proposal, have been able to “grant
207. At least some definitions of “Reprieve” might also permit civil pardons. For
instance, the Oxford English Dictionary defines the word (in its second definition)
as “a remission or a cancellation of any punishment or penalty.” Reprieve, OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com. This definition even uses the Pardon
Clause as an example of this broad meaning. Id.
208. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
209. 5 JAMES MADISON, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 128-32
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
210. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
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pardons and reprieves” suggests that Pinckney would have
made the pardon power coextensive with its traditional
scope: in other words, whatever could be pardoned or
reprieved in 1787 would have been permissible under
Pinckney’s plan. And, as shown in the prior Sections, pardons
in England and the colonies included purely financial
offenses with no possibility of prison time.
The word “Offences” was only proposed to be added to the
Pardon Clause on June 18, 1787, when Hamilton offered a
revised version of the clause.211 His draft would have given
the president “the power of pardoning all offences except
treason, which he shall not pardon without the approbation
of the senate.”212
A fair reading of Hamilton’s proposed Pardon Clause
suggests that he selected “Offences” deliberately. The exact
same document that Hamilton submitted proposed language
for other provisions—and it used numerous similar but
distinctive words. For instance, he proposed that judges could
hold their offices “during good behavior.”213 And impeachment
was available, in this draft, not for “crimes and
misdemeanors” but for “mal and corrupt conduct.” 214 The
timing of these submissions suggests that Hamilton
consciously chose “Offences” in the Pardon Clause and the
phrase “mal and corrupt conduct,” in his draft of the
impeachment clause.
But in spite of Hamilton’s proposal, Pinckney’s original
language for the pardon power survived until a new draft of
the proposed constitution was distributed at the Convention
on August 6, 1787. This document contained new language
for the pardon power, stating that the president “shall have
power to grant reprieves and pardons, but his pardon shall
not be pleadable in bar of impeachment.”215 Although the
language changed from Pinckney’s original version, the
211. Id. at 198, 205.
212. Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
213. Id. This phrase was used by Pinckney earlier, id. at 131, but Hamilton did
not alter his colleague’s wording.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 380.
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debates reflect no intent to narrow Pinckney’s vision; in fact,
the omission of “offenses” from this draft shows that the new
draft mirrored what Pinckney had initially prepared.
The Pardon Clause took a large step toward its final form
on August 25, 1787, when the words “but his pardon shall not
be pleadable in bar of an impeachment” were removed in
favor of “except in cases of impeachment.”216 But the word
“offenses” still did not appear in the document.
The next attempts to change the language of the pardon
power occurred on August 27, 1787. They offer little light,
however, about the sort of minor offenses that could be
pardoned.217 To be sure, the Founders discussed crimes.
Luther Martin of Maryland, for instance, moved to insert
“after conviction,” immediately after the words, “reprieves
and pardons.”218 But he withdrew his own motion as soon as
Wilson observed that pre-conviction pardons might help to
“obtain the testimony of accomplices.”219 This exchange offers
no light on whether civil offenses could be pardoned.
The Convention selected a Committee of Style on
September 10, 1787, “to revise the style of, and arrange, the
articles which had been agreed to,”220 including the pardon
power. Hamilton and Madison were members of the fiveperson committee. The committee informed the Convention
two days later that it had completed its work, and the
Convention began to review the various articles that day. The
Convention reached the pardon power three days later
(September 15, 1787).
This new language for the pardon power was identical to
the ultimate version that was ratified. It provided that the
president “shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons
216. Id. at 475, 480.
217. For instance, Sherman proposed amending the phrase “power to grant
reprieves and pardons” to read, “to grant reprieves until the ensuing session of
the Senate, and pardons with consent of the Senate.” Id. at 480. But nothing
therein suggests that “pardon” or “reprieve” would be narrowed from the powers
that English monarchs enjoyed.
218. Id. at 480.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 526, 530.
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for offences against the United States, &c[.]”221 Thus, it was
only in the final days of the convention that the word
“offences” was added to the Pardon Clause. No indication
exists that the Committee on Style sought to narrow
Pinckney’s original language—which appears intended to
have permitted any clemency that existed in England.
The Convention completed its review of the Constitution
that day, approving this version of the pardon power; two
days later, the Convention approved the engrossed form of
the Constitution.222 Thus, all of the precursors of the Pardon
Clause used either “offences” (which, this Article suggests,
had a broader meaning than “crime or [criminal]
misdemeanor”) or, as in Pinckney’s version, refrained from
imposing any limits on the types of purely monetary federal
penalties that the president could pardon.
No other relevant clues exist from the debates about the
Pardon Clause. But numerous other indications about the
scope of the pardon power can be gleaned from the debates
surrounding other clauses.
Perhaps most notably, the words “crime” and “felony”223
appear elsewhere, and repeatedly, in the Constitution and
drafts of it.224 It is reasonable to infer that Hamilton and the
221. Id. at 549 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). The phrase “&c”
indicates that text has been removed—namely the phrase that impeachments
could not be foreclosed by a presidential pardon. Elliot’s Debates do not show that
this version included the limiting language “except in cases of impeachment,” but
other sources confirm that the impeachment exception had been added by this
time. See ALEX SIMPSON JR., A TREATISE ON FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS 20 (1916).
222. SIMPSON, supra note 221, at 20-21.
223. The provision protecting elected officials from their own actions in the
chambers of Congress originated on May 29, 1787, when Charles Pinckney
introduced the following language: “the members of both Houses shall, in all
cases, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be free from arrest during
their attendance on Congress, and in going to and returning from it.” ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 209, at 126, 130. The Founders ultimately adopted similar
language: “The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their
Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and
returning from the same.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.
224. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where
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other members of the Committee on Style included “offences”
consciously and carefully—and distinguishably from
“crimes.”225 Prakash, in other words, was correct when he
concluded that “offenses” in the Pardon Clause meant
something different than “crimes.”226
Given the close attention the Founders paid to nuances
between words—including crimes, felonies, offenses, high
misdemeanors, misdemeanors, and criminal offences—it is
fair to conclude that the use of “offenses” in Article II was
deliberate and was intended to capture the full complement
of illegal activities under federal law.
Several other pieces of historical evidence support this
conclusion. In particular, Hamilton used “Offences”
distinctively from (and far more broadly than) “Crimes” on
numerous occasions in his own writings (although not in
every instance).227

the said Crimes shall have been committed . . . .”); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (“A Person
charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from
Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority
of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime.”); see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“To define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law
of Nations . . . .”); supra note 223 (quoting pertinent language from U.S. CONST.
art. I § 6, cl. 1).
225. For instance, on August 28, 1787, just a day after debating changes to the
pardon power, the Convention changed the phrase “high misdemeanor” to “other
crime” in what was then Article 15 of the draft constitution; the change was made
because “high misdemeanors” was believed to be unclear. ELLIOT’S DEBATES,
supra note 209, at 483, 487.
226. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
227. For instance, in an April 20, 1777, letter to the Committee of the New York
Convention, Hamilton explored the distinction between crimes, misdemeanors,
and private civil wrongs. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Committee of
the New York Convention (April 20, 1777), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 574-75 (John C. Hamilton ed., 1851). He specifically
juxtaposed “crimes” against “offenses [that] are of so slender a nature as to make
it prudent to dismiss them.” Id. at 574. Obviously, this letter was written a decade
before the Convention, so it proves nothing definitively, but it reflects that
Hamilton, at least on some occasions, used “offenses” to refer to a much broader
category of wrongdoing than he used the word “crimes.”
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Also, Hamilton pushed for a broad pardon power that
encompassed the power to pardon treason and to offer mass
amnesty to put down a rebellion, writing:
the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this
case in the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or
rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well-timed offer
of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of
the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it
may never be possible afterwards to recall. 228

Given that Hamilton wanted the president to be able to
pardon thousands of traitors, it seems obvious enough that
Hamilton would have wanted to afford the president
flexibility if numerous fines and forfeitures had been imposed
on rebels, especially if a remission of remitting these
penalties—civil offenses—would convince rebels to lay down
their arms. Pardoning civil offenses, in other words, would
presumably be part of the suite of clemency options that
Hamilton would have wanted presidents to enjoy.229
In sum, none of the proposals for the Pardon Clause
contained express limitations to crimes, such as by using the
word “crime” or the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors.”
All of the precursors of the Pardon Clause used either
“offences” (which, this Article suggests, had a broader
meaning than “crime” or “crime and misdemeanor”) or, as in
Pinckney’s version, refrained from limiting what the
president could pardon.
A review of proposals that other Founders submitted to
the Convention further suggests that “Offences” is a broad
term that encompasses “civil offenses.” For instance, Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina—who, as noted above,
introduced the first version of the Pardon Clause—offered
the following proposal on May 29, 1787: “All criminal
offences, except in cases of impeachment, shall be tried in the

228. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 123, at 428.
229. This exact scenario occurred following the Civil War; President Andrew
Johnson granted amnesty to Confederate soldiers, canceling extant forfeiture
orders to take their property. See infra notes 370-71 and accompanying text.
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state where they shall be committed.”230 On the same date,
Pinckney also proposed language231 authorizing Congress
“[t]o declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies
at sea, and of counterfeiting coin, and of all offences against
the laws of nations.”232 While “offences against the laws of
nations” was likely a term of art,233 the differences between
the proposed clauses suggest that Pinckney was careful in his
use of language, distinguishing—on the same day—between
“felonies,” “offences,” “offences against the laws of nations,”
and “criminal offences.”
This last term is especially noteworthy. Pinckney’s use of
the phrase “criminal offences” implies that there existed
other, non-criminal offenses. And John Rutledge of South
Carolina (later the nation’s second Chief Justice), used the
same phrase, proposing that “[t]he trial of all criminal
offences (except in cases of impeachment) shall be in the state
where they shall be committed; and shall be by jury.”234
Additional juxtapositions of constitutional proposals
show that “offenses” is a broad term. William Patterson of
New Jersey (who, like Rutledge, later served on the Supreme
Court) proposed this clause: “all punishments, fines,
forfeitures, and penalties, to be incurred for contravening
such acts, rules, and regulations, shall be adjudged by the
230. ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 209, at 126, 131 (emphasis added).
Pinckney’s use of “criminal offenses,” however, was not long-lived. On August 28,
1787, his proposed language was amended, without objection, to read, “[t]he trial
of all crimes (except in cases of impeachment) shall be by jury.” Id. at 483-84.
231. Also on May 29, 1787, Pinckney introduced the following language: “Any
person, charged with crimes in any state, fleeing from justice to another, shall, on
demand of the executive of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, and
removed to the state having jurisdiction of the offence.” Id. at 126, 132 (emphasis
added).
232. Id. at 126, 130 (emphasis added). The Constitution ultimately reflected the
following language: “To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
10.
233. See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to
“Define and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 447, 474 (2000). Stephens further notes that civil actions could be filed in
1790 for offenses against the law of nations by private parties. Id. at 490-95.
234. ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 209, at 381 (emphasis added).
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common-law judiciaries of the state in which any offence
contrary to the true intent and meaning of such acts, rules,
and regulations, shall have been committed or perpetrated.”235
Patterson’s use of “offences,” like Hamilton’s, Pinckney’s, and
Rutledge’s, suggests that “offences” encompassed noncriminal conduct for which only “fines” and “forfeiture” might
be available.236
Admittedly, a number of other Founders used “offence”
synonymously with “crime” during the Constitutional
Convention.237 And the Convention did not specifically
consider whether “Offences” encompassed non-criminal
conduct.
But perhaps the strongest piece of counterevidence
comes from the Fifth Amendment, which seemingly equates
“offence” with “crime.” It provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
235. Id. at 191-92 (emphasis added).
236. Elsewhere, Patterson proposed “[t]hat a citizen of one state, committing an
offence in another state of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same offence
as if it had been committed by a citizen of the state in which the offence was
committed.” Id. at 191-93 (emphasis added). Although the phrase “deemed guilty”
might suggest that “offence” refers to a crime, modern civil offenses did not exist.
237. Madison similarly equated “crimes” with “offences.” Id. at 484 (“The object
of this amendment [specifying that the “trial of all crimes . . . shall be by jury; and
such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been
committed”] was, to provide for trial by jury of offences committed out of any
state.”) (emphasis added). Pinckney proposed language that equated “crimes”
with “offences.” Id. at 128, 132 (“Any person, charged with crimes in any state,
fleeing from justice to another, shall, on demand of the executive of the state from
which he fled, be delivered up, and removed to the state having jurisdiction of the
offence.”) (emphasis added). And Mason, in discussing the trial of impeachments
against the president for treason and bribery, said that “[t]reason, as defined in
the Constitution, will not reach many great and dangerous offences.” Id. at 528.
These examples show that at least some of the available evidence suggests that
at least some Founders used the terms “crime” and “offence” interchangeably at
least some of the time. However, the balance of evidence suggests that “offences,”
as Hamilton used it, was designed to mean something broader than “crimes” or
“crimes and misdemeanors.”
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to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.238

Superficially, the Amendment might suggest that
“offence” refers exclusively to criminal violations. But, as
noted in Part II, all “offenses” were criminal in the United
States until the 1900s. Additionally, the Fifth Amendment
refers to “infamous crime,” “offence” and “criminal case.” This
phrasing is unlikely to be coincidental. As noted earlier,
Blackstone and other legal commentators viewed offenses as
a lesser type of crime—the sort of legal violation that might
today be civil.
Furthermore, “offence” is used in the clause that
prohibits double jeopardy, but other clauses apply to crime
(specifically an “infamous crime”)239 or criminal case. The best
reading is that the protection against double jeopardy was
intended to be broader than the protections that applied for
“crime.” Notably, an “offense” did not need to go to a grand
jury, whereas a “crime” did.240 Similarly, the right against
self-incrimination applied in any “criminal case,” not to any
“offence.” And the history of the Fifth Amendment shows
unambiguously that actions that were once criminal have
transformed into civil proceedings: the Takings Clause,
which appears at the end of the Fifth Amendment, is
typically enforced in civil proceedings.241 And to the extent
that a civil offense is alleged against a defendant, the
Supreme Court has implied that it may be pardoned: “From
the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference
between a man who ‘forfeits’ $8,674 because he has used the
money in illegal gambling activities and a man who pays a

238. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
239. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183 (1958) (treating “infamous
crime” as a crime punishable by more than a year in prison, making it
synonymous with a felony).
240. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68 (1904).
241. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005).
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‘criminal fine’ of $8,674 as a result of the same course of
conduct.”242
In any event, the use of “offence” in the Fifth Amendment
was no accident: the House243 and Senate,244 and the two
chambers jointly,245 approved versions of the Fifth
Amendment that used “offence” in the Double Jeopardy
Clause and nowhere else. Even a casual commitment to the
canon of meaningful variation suggests that “offence” was
broader than “crime.” The House version referred to “offence”
and “criminal case.”246 Even more revealing, the Senate
version referred to “crime” and, separately, “offence,” making
it hard to infer that the words were synonymous. And the
joint version approved by Congress during the constitutional
amendment process referred to “crime,” “criminal case,” and
“offence”—again raising the obvious question of why “offence”
would be used rather than “crime” if those words meant the
same thing. Simply put, it is hard to fathom that these words
were intended to have the identical meaning given that they
were used alongside one another.
Thus, the appearance of “offence” in the Fifth
Amendment confirms what the overwhelming weight of
historical evidence suggests: offenses are broader than
crimes, and included legal violations that have today evolved
into civil offenses.247

242. United States v. U.S. Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971) (“In both
instances, money liability is predicated upon a finding of the owner’s wrongful
conduct.”).
243. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES,
ORIGINS 300-01 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).

AND

244. Id. at 302-03.
245. Id. at 308.
246. Id. at 301.
247. All of this analysis, however, assumes that juxtaposing “offenses against
the United States” (in Article II) and “offenses” (in the Fifth Amendment) is a
suitable method of constitutional interpretation. But the Supreme Court has, very
specifically, reached the contrary conclusion:
[I]t is clear to us that the language of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
and of other cited parts of the Constitution are not of significance in
determining the scope of pardons of ‘offences against the United States’
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This Section has established that the word “offences” was
used carefully in Article II by people who drew distinctions
between “crimes,” “offences,” and similar words. The
evidence in this Section is not dispositive of the question
explored in this Article. Nevertheless, on balance, the fact
that no version of the pardon power sought to limit the
availability of clemency to “crimes,” and the fact that the
Founders did not vote to vest the president with a more
limited pardon power than English monarchs had, suggests
that “offences” is a broad term that includes modern civil
penalties.
C. Evidence Contemporaneous with the Constitutional
Convention
In addition to what happened at the Convention,
extrinsic evidence—the leading dictionary and treatise from
this era—support the conclusion that “offences” was broader
than “crimes” and would include modern civil offenses (if they
had existed at the time). These sources also confirm that a
“pardon” can include the remission of a fine or forfeiture that
is unrelated to any criminal act.
The leading dictionary of the era248 (published in 1785)—
that of the pioneering lexicographer Samuel Johnson—
defines “Offence” as “[c]rime; act of wickedness.”249 If this
were the only definition, we would likely infer that Hamilton
in Article II, Section 2, clause 1, of the enumerated powers of the
President.
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118 (1925). Thus, the very appearance of
“offence” in the Fifth Amendment has been ruled by the Supreme Court not to be
probative of what the same word meant in Article II—because the two were
adopted at different times in different contexts by different people using different
procedures.
248. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed.
1785). The Supreme Court regularly cites Johnson’s dictionary as an important
source of constitutional meaning. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct.
2550, 2561 (2014) (citing JOHNSON, supra at 1602-03 (4th ed. 1773)).
249. Offence, JOHNSON, supra note 248. This broad meaning of “Offence”
extended back decades. See, e.g., Offence, GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY
(4th ed. 1739) (noting that “offence” covers misdemeanors, omissions where the
law requires action, and acts that would result in fines or forfeitures only).
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used “offences” rather than “crimes” purely for stylistic
reasons. But Johnson’s dictionary offers a second, broader
definition of “offence”: “[a] transgression.”250 This definition is
consistent with other contemporary sources,251 and the
dictionary offers an even broader third meaning.252
Similarly, Johnson’s dictionary defines the noun
“Pardon” as: “1. Forgiveness of an offender. 2. Forgiveness of
a crime; indulgence. 3. Remission of a penalty.”253 Other
editions of Johnson’s dictionary define these terms
identically.254 The second definition would be unnecessary if
“crime” and “offences” were synonymous. And the third
definition is even broader than the other two. Another
dictionary from this era supports the conclusion that
“pardon” would have encompassed modern civil offenses (if
they had existed at the time).255
The leading legal treatise from this era also used
“offence” broadly—and broader than “crime.”256 For instance,
Mathew Bacon’s A New Abridgment of the Law, published in
1786, uses the word “offences” to include wrongs punishable
only by amercements (i.e., unmet monetary obligations to the
state unattended by threat of prosecution). “[W]here the
Offence is amerceable only,” Bacon notes, it is “[m]inima de

250. JOHNSON, supra note 248.
251. E.g., Offence, THOMAS SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1784). Multiple editions of Johnson’s dictionary used the same
definition. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 248 (1st ed. 1755); id. (3d ed. 1765); id.
(4th ed. 1770).
252. See JOHNSON, supra note 248 (defining “offence” as an “[i]njury”).
253. Pardon, JOHNSON, supra note 248. Both the verb “To pardon” and the noun
“pardon” also contained irrelevant additional definitions, such as “Pardon me, is
a word of civil denial, or slight apology.” Id. (The word “civil” in this definition is
not akin to the word “civil” in the term “civil offense.”).
254. See, e.g., Pardon, JOHNSON, supra note 248 (8th ed. 1799); id. (4th ed. 1773).
255. See Pardon, SHERIDAN, supra note 251 (2d ed. 1789) (defining “pardon” as
“remission of penalty”).
256. The Supreme Court has cited this treatise as a valuable source of
eighteenth-century law. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 257980 (2011).
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quibus non curat lex,” and no judge is required to impose
punishment.257
In discussing “For What Offences the Party is to be fined
or amerced,” Bacon provides examples demonstrating that
the word “offences” included wrongs for which non-criminal
monetary penalties were proper,258 and many of these
examples of amerceable offenses would not result in criminal
liability today. One example: “[i]f a dead Body in Prison, or
other place, whereupon an Inquest ought to be taken, be
interred, or suffered to lie so long, that it putrify before the
Coroner hath viewed it, the Gaoler or Township shall be
amerced.”259 In other words, the “offence” could only result in
a financial penalty. (And as noted in Part III.A, monarchs
were free to remit amercements.) Current federal regulations
for U.S. prisons contain a similar provision, instructing that
autopsies “ordinarily must be performed within 48 hours”
and that if a body is to be given to a funeral home, “no
preparation for burial, including embalming, should be
performed until a final decision is made on the need for an
autopsy.”260 The regulations impose no jail time for violating
these instructions.261 Thus, it is nearly certain that failing to
perform a timely autopsy or embalming a body would expose
the violator only to civil penalties—if that. But this act was
cited by Bacon as an example of an eighteenth-century
“offence” that could give rise to amercement and, therefore,
be pardoned.
Similarly, Bacon instructs judges to amerce the town “[i]f
any Homicide be committed, or dangerous Wound given,
whether with or without Malice, or even by Misadventure, or
Self-defense, in any (b) Town, or in the Lanes or Fields
thereof, in the (c) Day-time, and the Offender (d) escape.”262
Again, the townspeople would not today be jailed if they let a
felon slip out of town at night. But in 1786, the town itself—
257. 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 69 (5th ed. 1786).
258. 2 Id. at 504-06.
259. Id. at 505.
260. 28 C.F.R. § 549.80(c)(2) (2014).
261. Id.
262. 2 BACON, supra note 257, at 505.
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a non-human entity—would be amerced if the felon escaped
because the town had failed to comply with a statute
requiring town gates to be “shut from sun-setting to sunrising.”263 Each of these amerceable actions was described by
Bacon as an “offence.”264
Furthermore, even Bacon’s examples of finable offenses
include wrongs that would arguably be civil violations now.
Such examples included “if a Tithing-man refuse to make a
Presentment in a Leet,”265 “if a [juror] in a Leet depart
without giving his Verdict,”266 “[i]f one is present when a
Murder is done, and does not his best Endeavour to
apprehend the Murderer,”267 “if two are fighting, and others
looking on, who do not endeavour to part them, [and] one [of
the fighters] is killed” (which again could lead to a fine and
imprisonment).268 Bacon continued with additional examples
of acts that (1) were not criminal in 1786, but (2) could have
resulted in fines, and (3) could have been pardoned: “[i]f at a
Justice-Seat, held within a Forest, a Man makes a false
Claim of Privilege,”269 and “[i]f, by the Forest Law, Hue and
Cry is made for a Trespass in Venison” and the “Township or
Village within the Forest, . . . does not follow the Hue and
Cry.”270
Bacon’s discussion of the Crown’s pardon power similarly
supports the conclusion that the word “offences”
encompassed civil and non-civil wrongs, and that the pardon
power extended to both. “It is laid down in general,” he wrote,
263. Id.
264. Bacon gives a third example of an action subject to amercement: “[i]f the
Deciners ought to pay the Rent at the Leet (e) pro Certo letae” but “do not pay it.”
Id. at 505. In this example, “deciners” refers to the members of a “decennary” or
“tithing,” a group of ten households organized for administrative and policing
purposes. For a discussion of the origins of this system, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET
AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 27-28 (2009).
265. 2 BACON, supra note 257, at 505.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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“that the King may pardon any Offence whatever, whether
against the Common or Statute Law.”271 Bacon implied,
however, that there were moral limits on what a sovereign
could pardon.272 But notwithstanding Bacon’s precatory
words, a king, in practice, could have pardoned any offense.273
Moreover, in the next passage, Bacon observed that offenses
that were prohibited by law, not morality—that is, offenses
akin to modern civil offenses—were wholly suitable for
pardons:
But where a Thing in its own Nature lawful, is made unlawful by
Parliament, as the carrying Bell-metal, &c. out of the realm,
Importing Merchandizes in foreign Ships, Selling Wines beyond a
certain Price, or without a License, Multiplying Gold, &c. Coining
Money of a base Allay, &c. it was formerly taken as a general Rule,
that the King might dispense with it, as to a particular Time or
Place, or Person, so far as the Public was concerned in it . . . .274

This observation is crucial. Although in practice kings
and queens usually pardoned felons who caused great harm,
Bacon emphasized that these crimes were less suitable for
clemency than what we would now call civil offenses. Unless
Bacon is simply wrong in his assessment of the scope of the
pardon power, these passages conclusively demonstrate that
the word “offenses” encompassed civil offenses—i.e., noncriminal violations that are not inherently unlawful but are,
instead, “made unlawful by Parliament.”275
Bacon added that monarchs could pardon a trespasser’s
duty to post a bond or obligation to forfeit that bond.276 The
burden of forfeiting such a bond is, now, a civil offense.277
Bacon’s discussion of “Indictments” is also consistent
with these conclusions. In answering “What Matters are
indictable,” Bacon states that indictable offenses include both
271. 3 id. at 802.
272. See id.
273. See supra Part III.A.
274. 3 BACON, supra note 257, at 802-03.
275. Id. at 802.
276. See id. at 803-04.
277. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 163.29 (2014).
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“Capital Offences, such as Treasons and Felonies,” and
“inferior” “Crimes being of a public Nature,” as well as “all
other Contempts, all Disturbances of the Peace, all
Oppressions and all other . . . Misdemeanors whatsoever.”278
These lesser wrongs included “Disobedience” of a statute that
“prohibits a Matter of public Grievance, or commands a
Matter of public Convenience, as the Repairing the common
Streets of a Town.” Fines were adequate punishment for the
wrongs, and the payment of such a “Fine is, it seems, a good
Bar to the indictment, because by the Fine the End of the
Statute is satisfied.”279 This example is revelatory. A person
could have been indicted in 1786 for failing to repair the
common streets of a town. Breaching this sort of affirmative
duty today would rarely, if ever, lead to criminal liability; it
would be a civil offense.280 And Bacon stated unambiguously
that it could be pardoned.
Bacon’s list of indictable offenses that resemble civil
offenses continues. He observes that if a person who had a
license to use certain lands failed to repair a bridge and let it
fall into “Decay, he may be indicted.”281 And, although vague,
Bacon notes that a person could be indicted for “the Erecting
of an Inn” (but only if the indictment “set forth some
Circumstances that make it unlawful”).282 That sounds a
great deal like letting out rooms without a valid certificate of
occupancy or business license—which would be a civil offense
now. And in another passage Bacon suggests that diverting
a waterway and building cottages without disclosing them
are indictable offenses.283 These acts, like those discussed on

278. 3 BACON, supra note 257, at 96.
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., People v. Russell Place Realty Co., No. 2010-824 N CR, 2012 WL
2887990 (N.Y. App. Term June 29, 2012) (citing N.Y. Property Maintenance Code
§ 302.7).
281. 3 BACON, supra note 257, at 98.
282. Id. at 100.
283. Id. at 105 (clarifying that these could not be indicted if the place where the
offense occurred went unspecified but otherwise suggesting that indictment could
occur).
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the past few pages, would also be civil violations—such as
failing to get a building permit before constructing a house.284
Bacon’s analysis of forfeitures also supports the
conclusion that offenses included civil violations. Before and
after the Founding, kings could pardon forfeitures. 285
Forfeitures, however, are civil proceedings in the United
States (so long as the forfeiture action proceeds against the
property itself)—even when the property was acquired
through criminal conduct.286 Moreover, forfeitures could occur
even when no wrongdoing had occurred—such as when a
borrower failed to pay a debt. Accordingly, Bacon observes,
“where a Statute giveth a Forfeiture, either for Nonfeasance
or Misfeasance, the King shall have it, unless it be otherwise
particularly directed by the Statute.”287 The inclusion of
“Nonfeasance”—the failure to perform an act that is required
by law—is telling: kings could pardon forfeitures (as noted
above),288 and forfeitures could arise even when no criminal
conduct occurred. In other words, kings could pardon
penalties that arose because of an omission, rather than an
act. And that distinction is a paradigmatic difference
between criminal and civil liability.289
284. Bacon’s conclusions are consistent with those of earlier treatises. For
instance, William Nelson’s An Abridgment of the Common Law, published in
1726, distinguishes between pardons for “Murders, Felonies, and other Crimes,”
and pardons for “Actions, Suits, Fines, and Forfeitures,” which describe less
severe wrongs punishable by fine or amercement. 2 WILLIAM NELSON, AN
ABRIDGMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 1229-32 (1726).
285. 5 BACON, supra note 257, at 289 (1798). See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *402 (1902).
286. United States v. $27,000.00, More or Less in U.S. Currency, 865 F. Supp.
339, 340 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (noting that forfeiture is a civil proceeding); United
States v. Real Prop. Known as 311 Cleveland Ave., Hamilton, Ohio, 799 F. Supp.
824, 828 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (finding that forfeiture pursuant to civil forfeiture
statute concerning real property connected with controlled substances violations
is civil and not criminal in nature); United States v. Two Hundred Eighty
Thousand Five Hundred and Five Dollars ($280,505.00) in U.S. Currency, 655 F.
Supp. 1487, 1498 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
287. 5 BACON, supra note 257, at 518 (1798) (emphasis added).
288. Id.
289. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 7404 (2012) (authorizing Attorney General to direct a
civil action against a person who has refused or neglected to pay taxes), with 26
U.S.C. § 7201 (2012) (imposing criminal liability for purposefully attempting to
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In sum, the leading dictionary is consistent with the
thesis of this Article—though the evidence could support
either conclusion. The leading treatise provides even
stronger evidence: it overwhelmingly suggests that civil
offenses are pardonable.290
D. Evidence from Post-Convention Pardons
English and American pardoning behavior after the
Constitutional Convention further supports the conclusions
reached so far in Part III. In the months and years
immediately after the United States adopted its Constitution
in June 1788, King George III carried on with issuing
pardons of acts that would today be civil offenses 291 or nonfelony misdemeanors.292
Presidents soon followed this approach. George
Washington pardoned the following offenses that would
likely be civil today and which caused the defendants to incur
fines but not prison time: embargo violations,293 illegal
“evade or defeat any tax”); compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a) (2012) (imposing civil
penalties for failure to comply with the requirements and standards of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act), with 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012)
(concerning imprisonment for deliberately disclosing or obtaining health
information relating to another person).
290. This Section’s conclusions comport with the observation that “the Supreme
Court has consistently found ‘offenses’ to be a broader category than ‘crimes.’”
Stephens, supra note 233, at 501.
291. These included the imprisonment of a calico printer for “leaving work
unfinished,” 305 PARDONS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 160, at ii (discussing the
case of Samuel Dunkerly) (citing HO 47/12/121, folios 482-485) (Oct. 1790), and
setting fire to corn or wheat (without, apparently, evidence of intent to commit
arson) (Mar. 1789). Id. pt. I.B., 261. Cf., 54 U.S.C. § 100722(a) (2014) (holding any
person responsible for loss or destruction of national park resources “liable to the
United States for response costs and damages”). He also pardoned criminal
convictions for the vague offense called “negligence.” 305 PARDONS AND
PUNISHMENTS, supra note 160, at 5, 21, 124, 144.
292. These included “rioting” against a “horse tax,” 305 PARDONS AND
PUNISHMENTS, supra note 160, at 253 (discussing pardon of Samuel Horne from
August 1788, just two months after the Constitution was ratified); see also Pardon
of Sept. 18, 1788 (petty larceny), id. at 283, 286. Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.1
(2014) (imposing a fine of not more than $250 for petty theft).
293. Pardons of Munnuccheyen & Salder (Dec. 24, 1794), microformed on
General Records of the State Department, Record Group (RG) 59, Presidential
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importation294 (including of two bags of coffee),295 and breach
of the revenue laws.296 John Adams similarly pardoned illegal
landing297 (including with such dastardly objects as eighteen
bags of coffee298 and sugar299); illegal importation of sugar and
various other unspecified items;300 and—in a paradigmatic
example of a civil offense—lacking proper licensing for a
ship.301 And Thomas Jefferson remitted fines for all of the
following offenses that resemble civil offenses or offenses that
are both criminal and civil: illegally landing with watches,302
maintaining a disorderly house,303 having an unlicensed

Pardons & Remission, 1794-1893, roll no. 1 (Nat’l Archives Microfilm Publ’ns)
[hereinafter Presidential Pardons & Remission RG 59]. The research in this
Section is based on the extraordinary dataset of pardons compiled by Professor
P.S. Ruckman, Jr., who generously shared this information to support the writing
of this Article. Most of these pardons affected Washington, D.C. residents.
294. Pardons of David Blair (Apr. 15, 1794), James Green (June 11, 1794), and
William Martin (June 11, 1794) in Presidential Pardons & Remission Records RG
59, supra note 293.
295. Pardon of Robert Gage (Sept. 17, 1796), in Presidential Pardons &
Remission Records RG 59, supra note 293.
296. Pardon of Stephen Neilson (Mar. 2, 1797), in Presidential Pardons &
Remission Records RG 59, supra note 293.
297. Pardon of John Burnett (June 10, 1800), in Presidential Pardons &
Remission Records RG 59, supra note 293.
298. Pardon of Robert Manton (June 1, 1798), in Presidential Pardons &
Remission Records RG 59, supra note 293.
299. Pardon of John Cassin (Feb. 17, 1800), in Presidential Pardons &
Remission Records RG 59. Another convict was sentenced to prison for illegally
landing watches. See Pardon of Edward Gilbert (Apr. 22, 1799), in Presidential
Pardons & Remission Records RG 59, supra note 293.
300. Pardon of Slocum Fowler (Feb. 1, 1800), in Presidential Pardons &
Remission Records RG 59, supra note 293.
301. Pardon of Joseph Billips, John Hicks, Jesse Roper and Robert Campbell
(Mar. 9, 1799), in Presidential Pardons & Remission Records RG 59, supra note
293.
302. Pardon of William Priestman (June 27, 1801), in Presidential Pardons &
Remission Records RG 59, supra note 293.
303. Pardons of Henny Day (Oct. 16, 1804), George Cunningham (June 6, 1805),
Peter Colter (June 13, 1805), and James McCutchen (Feb. 8, 1809), in
Presidential Pardons & Remission Records RG 59, supra note 293.
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billiard table,304 operating a gambling house,305 selling
“spirituous liquor,”306 and breaching the peace.307 Jefferson
also twice pardoned James Topham for trading slaves
(including the remittance of the then-massive fine of
$16,124)—an act that today is both a criminal308 and civil309
offense. Jefferson also remitted multiple penalties after
individuals breached the revenue law.310 Thus, the United
States’ first three presidencies were replete with clemency for
violations of federal law and laws of the District of Columbia
that would today be civil offenses.
In the modern era, Franklin Roosevelt’s pardons during
the rise of the New Deal reflect Roosevelt’s comfort with
pardoning an array of offenses that he and his allies in
Congress created. During his second term, Roosevelt
pardoned—in what sounds like a classic civil offense—a

304. Pardon of James Moore (Mar. 29, 1804), in Presidential Pardons &
Remission Records RG 59, supra note 293.
305. Pardon of Louis LeFevre (Feb. 5, 1806), in Presidential Pardons &
Remission Records RG 59, supra note 293.
306. Pardons of Jane McGraw (June 18, 1805), Thomas Nevitt (Aug. 5, 1805),
William Prime (June 16, 1806), George Broone (June 18, 1806), and John Staines
Brasheard (Jan. 13, 1807), in Presidential Pardons & Remission Records RG 59,
supra note 293.
307. Pardon of Wilford Knott (Oct. 11, 1806), in Presidential Pardons &
Remission Records RG 59, supra note 293.
308. 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a) (2012); 22 U.S.C. § 7109(b)(1) (2012).
309. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2012).
310. Pardons of Adam Ganter (May 1, 1805), David Briggs (Aug. 29, 1805), John
Paulson (Sept. 16, 1806), Perry Paulson (Sept. 16, 1806), Gabriel Shad (Jan. 25,
1803), Joseph Barnaby (Aug. 1806), John Adams (June 4, 1806), and Stephen
Delano (Nov. 4, 1807), in Presidential Pardons & Remission Records RG 59, supra
note 293. Thus, there is ample precedent for remitting tax offenses. This points
to a possible use for civil-offense pardons. Consider the more-than $2 trillion held
overseas by U.S. companies, which are waiting to repatriate that money until a
favorable tax environment appears. See Richard Rubin, U.S. Companies Are
Stashing $2.1 Trillion Overseas to Avoid Taxes, BLOOMBERG BUS., Mar. 4, 2015,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-04/u-s-companies-arestashing-2-1-trillion-overseas-to-avoid-taxes. A president could potentially remit
some portion of the taxes if these companies returned the income to the United
States or agreed (as a term of the remittance) to repatriate money on a fixed
schedule in the future.
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person convicted of “maintenance of a common nuisance.”311
He pardoned tax evasion (related to liquor,312 tariffs,313 and
other taxes).314 He also pardoned a person who had entered
the United States illegally,315 raising the obvious question of
whether civil immigration offenses could likewise be
pardoned or addressed by a reprieve.
Roosevelt’s third term provides additional evidence that
civil penalties may be altered by presidential clemency. For
example, Roosevelt remitted fines for numerous offenses
(that look like modern civil offenses) after prison or probation
terms had been served. His pardons included clemency for
selling insurance without a license;316 filing a false wage
claim;317 charging illegal fees for procuring loans;318 and
illegally selling cigarettes.319 He issued numerous other
pardons in response to violations of statutory offenses outside
Title 18 (which contains the criminal code), including
“making false entries in . . . bank records”320 and violating the

311. Pardon of Harriet Lasson (Mar. 11, 1937), 45 Pardon Warrants RG 204,
supra note 10, at 182.
312. See, e.g., Pardon of Joseph Sanford Pearce (May 26, 1937), in 45 Pardon
Warrants RG 204, supra note 10, at 227; see also Pardon of Helen S. Blaylock
(Mar. 11, 1937), in 45 Pardon Warrants RG 204, supra note 10, at 179 (pardoning
the failure to have “stamps” to sell liquor).
313. Pardon of Abner W. La Flair (Sept. 18, 1937), in 46 Pardon Warrants RG
204, supra note 10, at 82.
314. Pardon of Charles K. Biggs (Sept. 18, 1937), in 46 Pardon Warrants RG
204, supra note 10, at 71.
315. Pardon of Daniel Norman Munroe (Apr. 26, 1938), in 46 Pardon Warrants
RG 204, supra note 10, at 229.
316. Pardon of Gerald F. Laughlin (June 16, 1943), in 51 Pardon Warrants RG
204, supra note 10, at 310.
317. Pardon of Milton C. Seelig (Mar. 12, 1943), in 51 Pardon Warrants RG 204,
supra note 10, at 218.
318. Pardon of Edward A. Campbell (Oct. 18, 1943), in 52 Pardon Warrants RG
204, supra note 10, at 142.
319. Pardon of Sadie Kaplowitz (June 8, 1944), in 52 Pardon Warrants RG 204,
supra note 10, at 378.
320. Pardon of Lawrence A. Nixon (Mar. 4, 1941), in 49 Pardon Warrants RG
204, supra note 10, at 142.

2016]

PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY

723

Air Commerce Act of 1926;321 the Radio Act of 1927;322 the
Emergency Price Controls Act of 1942;323 the national postal
laws;324 the Selective Service Act;325 and the Migratory Bird
Act.326 Perhaps most illuminating, Roosevelt pardoned a
violation of the securities laws (under 15 U.S.C. § 77q)327— an
act routinely construed by modern courts as civil rather than
criminal.328 And, of course, agencies regularly settled
disputes during in the New Deal and have done so ever
since—raising the question of how agencies can settle their
demands for civil penalties if their settlement authority is not
derivative of the president’s pardon power.329
The array of early presidential pardons and pardons from
the era when civil offenses became ubiquitous (under FDR)
support this Article’s finding that federal clemency reaches
civil offenses.
321. Pardon of Edward Heckelbech (July 15, 1943), in 52 Pardon Warrants RG
204, supra note 10, at 28.
322. Pardon of George R. Butler (June 14, 1944), in 52 Pardon Warrants RG
204, supra note 10, at 426.
323. Pardon of Albert Yakus (Oct. 14, 1944), in 53 Pardon Warrants RG 204,
supra note 10, at 93.
324. Pardon of Nancy L. Dickens (Sept. 26, 1942), in 51 Pardon Warrants RG
204, supra note 10, at 77.
325. Pardon of Horace Woodrow Hampton (May 23, 1942), in 50 Pardon
Warrants RG 204, supra note 10, at 326.
326. Pardon of M. E. Bogle (May 1, 1942), in 50 Pardon Warrants RG 204, supra
note 10, at 301.
327. Pardon of Alex Mengarelli (Dec. 20, 1944), in 53 Pardon Warrants RG 204,
supra note 10, at 115.
328. See, e.g., SEC v. Monterosso, 756 F.3d 1326, 1338 (11th Cir. 2014); SEC v.
Leffers, 289 Fed. Appx. 449, 452 (2d Cir. 2008); SEC v. Inorganic Recycling Corp.,
No. 99 Civ. 10159, 2002 WL 1968341, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002).
329. Since the late 1700s, Congress has authorized secretaries within a given
administration to remit fines and forfeitures. See, e.g., Remission Act of Mar. 3,
1797, ch. 13, 1 Stat. 506; United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 25152 (1825). That trend continued in the years that followed. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 2,
1813, ch. 7, 6 Stat. 122. But agencies, including those not expressly authorized by
Congress, routinely settle cases. This suggests that the president, too, must have
these powers. See supra note 20 (providing examples of multi-billion dollar
settlements). It would be perverse if a line attorney could settle a case but the
president could not remit a fine to a commensurate (or greater) degree.
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E. Post-Convention Caselaw
And what have courts said about this issue? No court has
expressly addressed whether presidents may pardon civil
offenses. Two conflicting pieces of dicta, however, create
ambiguity. On the one hand, the Court opined that federal
clemency extends to “crimes”—suggesting that non-crimes
(i.e., civil offenses) are beyond the president’s power to
remit.330 But the Court did not, in that case, consider whether
non-criminal activity could be pardoned. And federal civil
offenses did not even exist at that time,331 so it is hardly
surprising that the Court did not extend the pardon power to
still-unhatched regulatory penalties. On the other hand, the
Court has stated that presidential clemency extends to “fines,
penalties, and forfeitures of every description arising under
the laws of [C]ongress.”332
The historical research presented earlier in this Part of
the Article would likely dictate the outcome of the case if a
court considered whether presidents may pardon civil
offenses; as noted several times, the Supreme Court has
unambiguously stated that history is critical in assessing the
scope of the pardon power.333 But courts would, of course, look
to post-Convention caselaw, and this Section reviews the
most relevant authorities.
To begin, however, this Article should make clear that it
does not rely on a pun to prove its thesis: the mere fact that
civil violations are sometimes called “civil offenses” does not
necessarily make them “offenses” as that term is used in
Article II. By analogy, a future offense may not be pardoned
by the president even though there is no language to that
effect in the Constitution: such an act of clemency would be
330. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833) (“A
pardon . . . exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment
the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.”).
331. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 83 (noting that civil offenses first
appeared around 1846).
332. See, e.g., Pollock v. Bridgeport Steam-Boat Co. (The Laura), 114 U.S. 411,
413-14 (1885) (emphasis added) (excepting from this conclusion both
impeachment and fines “imposed by a co-ordinate department of the government
for contempt of its authority”).
333. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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inconsistent with the meaning of “pardon,” which relates only
to past offenses. This Section reviews caselaw to assess
whether a civil offense falls within the scope of what
presidential clemency may reach.
As noted in Part III.A, all federal offenses were crimes
when Chief Justices Marshall observed in Wilson (in 1833)
that presidential clemency applied to “crimes.” But so, too,
might a case from 1833 have said either that the First
Amendment protected “newspapers” (without foreclosing
that the Internet might later be protected) or the Second
Amendment protected ownership of “rifles and muskets”
(without foreclosing the right to own a shotgun, even though
it did not come into use until 1850).334 Civil offenses, like the
Internet or shotguns, are an innovation that requires
retrofitting a constitutional clause from the 1780s to fit a new
situation.335
American caselaw offers a number of useful clues about
how best to read the pardon power. The first probative case
arose in 1806. There, in United States v. Yeaton,336 the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia considered a dispute that
arose after President Madison remitted a forfeiture order of
a boat that had violated an embargo. A ship had crossed into
prohibited waters in violation of an Act that restricted
trading with Santo Domingo in what is now the Dominican
Republic. The Act permitted forfeiture of any boat that was
knowingly used to violate the embargo, and the offending
ship was subjected to a forfeiture order. The owner, William
Yeaton, petitioned for clemency and persuaded Madison to
remit the forfeiture order provided that Yeaton paid

334. See Gun Timeline, PBS: HIST. DETECTIVES, http://www.pbs.org/opb/
historydetectives/technique/gun-timeline/.
335. Even mala prohibita offenses, which—according to conventional wisdom
are illegal but not immoral or evil—were crimes, not civil offenses. See Kempe v.
United States, 151 F.2d 680, 688 (8th Cir. 1945); Michael L. Travers, Mistake of
Law in Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1301 n.3 (1995).
336. 28 F. Cas. 799 (C.C.D.C. 1813) (No. 16,779); see also Act of Feb. 28, 1806,
ch. 9, 2 Stat. 351.
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whatever tariffs he would have owed had the ship done
everything legally.337
The parties contested whether the remission order could
cancel private claims to the vessel. But both parties accepted
that Madison could remit the portion of the forfeiture due to
the government. Importantly, the Act at issue did not provide
any possibility of prison time: therefore, in modern parlance,
it was a civil forfeiture statute—even though that term did
not exist.338 Thus, although the violation was not
denominated as a civil offense, it closely resembled modern
federal civil-offense statutes—and the president pardoned it,
and no one disputed his power to do so.339
The next clue from caselaw appeared roughly a decade
later in Ex parte Marquand.340 In Marquand, the Circuit
Court for the District of Massachusetts confirmed (albeit in
dictum) that presidents may pardon fines for what are, in
essence, civil offenses. The dispute arose when a man bribed
a duty collector; he was caught by other officials (customs
officers) for failing to pay sufficient duty. The only penalty for
this offense was financial. The proceeding to impose this
penalty on the man who had underpaid his tariffs was
conducted in civil court under civil procedures. The
government brought an action to enforce the legal violation
through a civil “debt collection” procedure—a practice that

337. EDWARD SANGSTER, ADMINISTRATOR OF HUGH WEST, H.R. REP. NO. 36-250,
at 19 (1860).
338. Act of Feb. 28, 1806, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 351 (stating that any unlawful ship,
vessel or cargo found on board “shall be wholly forfeited, and may be seized and
condemned in any court of the United States having competent jurisdiction”).
339. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1083(a) (2012) (permitting fines for the operation or
use of a vessel for the carriage or transportation of passengers “between a point
or place within the United States and a gambling ship”); 19 U.S.C. § 1497(a)
(2012) (penalties for failure to declare are forfeiture or fine without
imprisonment); 19 U.S.C. § 1681b (2012) (violators of 19 U.S.C. § 1681a, who
illegally import tobacco products into the United States, are subject to fines and
forfeiture but not imprisonment); 19 U.S.C. § 1683f (2012) (anyone who
unlawfully imports softwood lumber into the United States is subject to fines and
forfeiture); 19 U.S.C. § 1706a (2012) (penalties for trading without required
certificate of documentation are forfeiture and fines without imprisonment).
340. 16 F. Cas. 776 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 9100).
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the Supreme Court eventually endorsed much later (in
1871).341
The statute in question expressly awarded half of the
recovery to the tariff collector. And in this instance, the
collector was the same person who had accepted the bribe.
The court, unsurprisingly, lamented the need (under the
statute) to require the bribe-payer to give additional money
to the bribe-taker. But it ordered that outcome, observing
that only the president had the power to cancel the fine “since
the constitution has committed to the president the power to
grant reprieves and pardons for offences, against the United
States.”342 This statement, though dicta, suggests that purely
monetary penalties could be pardoned.
Then, in 1821, in United States v. Lancaster,343 the
Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
the president could cancel the government’s interest in what
was, in essence, a qui tam action. The only issue in dispute
was whether the pardon had the ancillary effect of canceling
the moiety to which the private litigant (now called a relator)
would be entitled. The court held that the pardon canceled
both the government’s interest and the private party’s (i.e.,
the informer’s/relator’s) interest.344 Although the court
declined to consider related questions about the power of a
pardon to cancel monetary penalties owed to private
informers,345 the case, like the two others just discussed,
341. Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. 531 (13 Wall.) 552 (1871) (upholding
the right of the federal government to obtain fines or forfeiture (or both)—that
were based on a criminal statute—in a “debt collection” case in a civil proceeding).
342. Marquand, 16 F. Cas. at 777.
343. 26 F. Cas. 859 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 15,557).
344. Id. at 860 (“That the power of remission vested in the secretary of the
treasury extends to such a case, and that, where so exercised, the interest of an
individual in the penalty, not consummated by judgment, may be defeated, is
unquestionable.”). See also Pollock v. Bridgeport Steam-Boat Co. (The Laura), 114
U.S. 411, 415-16 (1885); United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 256
(1825).
345. Lancaster, 26 F. Cas. at 860 (“But this case does not decide the question
whether the president can, by his pardon, defeat the inchoate right of a private
person, in a case where the remedy for the recovery of the penalty or forfeiture
can be prosecuted only by and in the name of the United States.”).
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confirms that presidents may remit fines that resemble
today’s civil actions—at least insofar as the president remits
a penalty owed to the federal government.
A fourth early case that casts light on the central
question posed by this Article is Levy Court of Washington
County v. Ringgold,346 decided in 1826. The case noted that a
tax bill had been “pardoned,” reducing the amount owed—
$2,267.66, which had already been halved—to $607.49. The
73% remittal reflected both “[1] pardons and [2] fines not
collected.”347 The pardon was issued by an administrator in
the District of Columbia’s municipal government, but no
reason exists to think that the president, who may pardon
offenses in Washington, D.C.,348 had any less power to remit
the defendant’s tax debt.349 This holding suggests that early
understandings of the pardon power included the power to
cancel any debt owed to the government. If the failure to pay
the debt is, in itself, an offense, the act of non-payment may
be pardoned. The various early presidential pardons of
unpaid taxes discussed above support this conclusion.
Other relevant cases arose decades later. United States
v. Klein,350 decided in 1871, involved a chess-like series of
moves by the different branches of government that affected
the restoration of the rights of those who had supported the
Confederacy during the Civil War. Congress enacted a
346. 15 F. Cas. 439 (C.C.D.C. 1826) (No. 8305), aff’d, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 451 (1831).
347. Id. at 439.
348. Letter from Roger C. Adams, Pardon Att’y, DEP’T OF JUSTICE , to David A.
Guard, CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY FOUND., http://static1.squarespace.com/static/
53ce893fe4b076d747fd326e/t/53d6b7f9e4b0d47dc085ba57/1406580729050/DClet
ter2.pdf (“[T]he President handles clemency in cases involving criminal violations
of the D.C. Code.”); see also 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS AND CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES 136 (Mary Bosworth ed., 2005) (“However, presidential clemency
power does extend to convicted offenders in Washington, D.C., federal territories,
and the U.S. military.”); ANDREW NOVAK, COMPARATIVE EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARDON POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE OF

MERCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 117 (2016) (“[O]nly the president of the United
States (and not the executive mayor) has the ability to pardon offenses under the
federal district law of Washington, DC.”).
349. See Ringgold, 15 F. Cas. at 440.
350. 80 U.S. (8 Wall.) 128 (1871).
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statute that purported to prevent any Southerners from
relying on a pardon by President Lincoln to recover the
proceeds of property that had been forfeited to the Union and
sold during or after the war. The administration claimed that
the legislation was unconstitutional because it impinged on
the judiciary’s power to establish rules of decision and
because it impinged on the president’s prerogative to grant
pardons and reprieves. The Supreme Court agreed with the
executive branch on both points, thus letting pardons cancel
a wide array of forfeitures.351
Klein is relevant to the present discussion because it
confirmed that a presidential pardon was valid in restoring
property rights and interests, even when Congress sought to
strip those rights. If Congress could not nullify a pardon’s
efficacy in canceling the punishment imposed by forfeiture—
by enacting a statute that specifically sought to achieve that
result—it would be strange if it could strip the president of
this power merely by reclassifying punishments as civil
offenses.352
Perhaps the strongest doctrinal support for civil pardons
appeared in 1885. As noted in the opening of this section, the
Supreme Court stated in The Laura that:
except in cases of impeachment and where fines are imposed by a
co-ordinate department of the government for contempt of its
authority, the President, under the general, unqualified grant of
power to pardon offenses against the United States, may remit fines,
penalties, and forfeitures of every description arising under the laws
of Congress.353

351. Id. at 145-48.
352. Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (8 Wall.) 154, 155-56 (1871), decided
later that same year, reached the same conclusion. The forfeiture order in that
case occurred because a female slave owner traveled south with several dozen
slaves to avoid emancipation. The Court held that a presidential pardon entitled
her to avoid the Court of Claims’ forfeiture order.
353. Pollock v. Bridgeport Steam-Boat Co. (The Laura), 114 U.S. 411, 413-14
(1885) (emphasis added); see also HUMBERT, supra note 42, at 51-52 (“The [Laura]
Court did not question the right of the President to remit, through the exercise of
his power to grant pardons, fines and forfeitures of every description which arise
under the laws of Congress.”).
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The phrase “every description”—in the specific context of
fines and forfeitures—suggests that the pardon power
reaches civil offenses.
Forty years later, the Supreme Court tested The Laura
Court’s conclusion that “fines . . . imposed by a co-ordinate
department of the government for contempt of its
authority”354 could not be pardoned. In Ex parte Grossman,355
the Court considered whether presidents could pardon a
court’s criminal-contempt order. In the underlying case, the
trial court held Grossman in criminal contempt for violating
an injunction against selling liquor and sentenced him to one
year’s imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. President Coolidge
conditionally pardoned Grossman, permitting him to avoid
imprisonment if he paid the fine. Grossman paid the fine and
was released. The trial judge (whose order was vitiated by
the pardon) arranged for Grossman to be arrested and
imprisoned, notwithstanding the pardon. The Supreme
Court unanimously vacated the order, holding that criminal
penalties were pardonable.
Although this holding has little to do with the availability
of pardons for civil offenses, the Court’s discussion provided
some relevant, though non-binding, comments. The Court
distinguished between pardons of contempt orders designed
to “punish the contemnor for violating the dignity of the court
and the King, in the public interest” and contempt orders
“necessary to secure the rights of the injured [private] suitor,”
such as by forcing an evasive witness to testify.356 The Court
held that pardons of public-interest contempts were lawful;
pardons of contempt orders that affected private litigation
exceeded the pardon power. But contrary to the overly broad
reading offered by at least one prominent scholar,357 the case
tells us nothing about what the president may pardon if the
354. The Laura, 114 U.S. at 413.
355. 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
356. Id. at 111 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
357. Id. Caminker relies on Grossman to dispute the existence of a civil pardon
power. See Caminker, supra note 92, at 371, 371 n.153 (citing Ex parte Grossman,
267 U.S at 120). However, Caminker overreads Grossman’s civil-criminal
distinction by suggesting that Grossman forecloses pardons in any civil context.
Id. at 371 n.153.
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government is seeking damages in a civil proceeding. The
best reading of Grossman is, as noted above, that the
president may cancel contempts enforcing the government’s
rights, but cannot cancel those enforcing a private party’s
rights. Under this reading, the contempts that most resemble
civil offenses—monetary penalties without a criminal trial
that arise as part of the government’s enforcement of a noncriminal law—could be pardoned.358
On balance, the pardons of early presidents and cases
from the last 210 years, suggest that the pardon power is best
read as reaching civil offenses.359 In fact, it was only at the
launch of the New Deal that the Court began to uphold civil
offenses that lacked any mens rea requirement.360 As
discussed in the next Part (which explores whether the policy
considerations that underlie the pardon power justify letting
clemency reach civil offenses as well as how presidents might
use the power to grant clemency for civil offenses), the
justifications of clemency for civil offenses are often stronger
than for crimes.

358. There is some evidence that all contempts should be viewed as, at their
essence, civil offenses. The Supreme Court observed just one year before
Grossman that “[w]hile contempt may be an offense against the law and subject
to appropriate punishment, . . . such offenses have been regarded as sui generis
and not ‘criminal prosecutions’ within the Sixth Amendment or common
understanding.” Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1924).
359. In addition to the cases cited above, an 1852 Opinion of the Attorney
General concluded that the president could pardon a fine where a fine was the
only available penalty. See Pardoning Power of the President, 5 Op. Att’y Gen.
579, 590-91 (1852). Two abolitionists were fined a massive sum—more than
$20,000 between them, or nearly $600,000 in present-day dollars—for helping to
“transport” seventy-four slaves out of the South. The statute resembled modern
civil offenses insofar as no possibility of incarceration existed—unless the fine
went unpaid. The opinion concluded that the two offenders could be pardoned
fully and that the amount owed to the slaveowners could be remitted. Id. at 582.
360. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (upholding strict liability
and vicarious liability for a company president who was convicted of a “public
welfare” offense).
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IV. STRUCTURAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS—AND
POTENTIAL USES OF CLEMENCY FOR CIVIL OFFENSES
Commentators have offered numerous rationales for
pardons, but the strongest structural and policy
considerations fall into seven categories. Most support the
premise that civil offenses should be pardonable. In the
course of discussing these rationales, this Article discusses a
number of possible uses of the power to grant clemency for
civil offenses. This discussion seeks merely to open a dialogue
and to explore possibilities for how the power would be used.
Subsequent work—and, perhaps, subsequent presidential
acts—will reveal the exact contours of this new (but 229-yearold) power.
1. Justice. The leading modern account for pardons
focuses on justice—correcting excessive or improper
punishments. Countless commentators agree,
observing that “clemency can be used to achieve
justice, by individualizing sentences and remitting
undeserved punishment.”361 Civil pardons can
advance this goal. Imagine, for instance, that a man
smoked a small amount of marijuana on his boat and
lost his entire boat to a civil forfeiture.362 Or imagine
that the boat’s owner lost his boat even though he did
not commit any crime. In 1974, the Supreme Court
upheld the forfeiture of a yacht under these
conditions.363 Other citizens have lost their life
savings when they carried cash across a border
361. Kobil, supra note 66, at 571 (noting that this use of the clemency power
“rests on a vision of human nature that is fundamentally less pessimistic” than
other explanations and “can properly be said to be a fundamental part of any
system of justice”).
362. John Enders, Forfeiture Law Casts a Shadow on Presumption of Innocence,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-04-18/local/me24209_1_forfeiture-law (“[A]lleged abuses make big headlines. A small-town
Southern sheriff seizes a Rolls-Royce from a drug dealer and uses it as his
personal car. Local police in Little Compton, R.I., net $3.8 million in a drug bust
and outfit their cars with $1,700 video cameras and heat detection devices for a
police force of seven. The owner of a sailboat loses the craft after a crew member
is caught with a small amount of marijuana.”).
363. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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without declaring that they were doing so—even
when there was no evidence that the money would be
used for an illegal purpose.364 The outcome of these
cases likely offends (for most readers) two separate
instincts related to justice: proportionality and
culpability. Punishing the owner harshly for someone
else’s misconduct may be legal—but its harshness
makes clemency an appealing option in such civilforfeiture cases.
Concerns about justice are particularly acute in the
context of civil offenses. Federal criminal convictions
usually require a unanimous jury; liability for a civil
offense, by contrast, is typically issued by a judge. A
criminal conviction requires the evidence to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; civil liability can
attach based on preponderance of the evidence.
Further, civil offenses (i) are not attended by a right
against self-incrimination, (ii) can produce liability
based on inferences drawn by the invocation of the
right against self-incrimination in a criminal case,
(iii) nullify the right to confront adverse witnesses,
and (iv) lack habeas review. In other words, the risk
of error or injustice is greater in a civil-offense case
than in a criminal case because it is so easy to
penalize an alleged offender.
2. Mercy. Traditionally, pardons have been justified in
terms of “mercy and caprice.”365 These rationales were
ubiquitous among English pardons when the
Constitution was ratified.366 Mercy might support a
364. See, e.g., German Lopez, Why Police Could Seize a College Student’s Life
Savings Without Charging Him for a Crime, VOX (Oct. 8, 2015),
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/17/8792623/civil-forfeiture-charles-clarke
(“The
government is mainly basing its forfeiture of Clarke’s $11,000 on one claim: His
checked bag and money smelled like marijuana, so, according to law enforcement,
the money was very likely obtained or meant for illegal drug activity.”).
365. HUMBERT, supra note 42, at 5.
366. See 305 PARDONS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 160, para. 107, at 240
(noting that the prisoner was “seduced by bad company”); id. para. 109 (noting
that the prisoner is “poor” and “has a wife and 5 small children”); id. para. 116,
at 241 (noting the prisoner’s poor health); id. para. 127, at 244 (alleging that “the
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pardon when a convict is sick or old, or when he has
small children. Or it might result in a pardon if the
convict’s family would have no other means of support
or if the convict is a first-time offender. But this does
not mean that the punishment was unjust; in fact, a
pardon could be issued even if the applicant received
a lenient sentence. A similar principle applies to civil
offenses. For instance, if a teenage boy is fined
$100,000 for plucking a flower from wetlands, or if a
new doctor would be fined millions of dollars for an
accidental HIPAA violation, or if the government
moved to seize a single mother’s home because her
daughter is selling illegal drugs from the house, civiloffense clemency advances the interests of mercy.
3. Caprice. Unlike considerations of justice and mercy,
caprice poses problems for civil pardons. Kings and
presidents have often pardoned their loyalists and the
wealthy.367 Self-serving (or seemingly self-serving)
pardons, such as George W. Bush’s grant of a reprieve
to his Vice President’s chief of staff, or Bill Clinton’s
pardon of donor Marc Rich, or Ronald Reagan’s
pardon of Caspar Weinberger368 are troubling. But
they are legal. Even so, it is all too easy and all too
distasteful to imagine major donors (or the companies
prosecutors had not intended such a harsh punishment”); id. para. 9, at 247
(coming “from an honest and respectable family in the ‘middle rank of life’ some
of whom being Quakers were precluded from giving evidence on oath” (no citation
for quotation provided)); id. para. 53, at 258 (noting that the prisoner was one of
the “oldest prisoners” on the hulk).
367. Kobil, supra note 66, at 571 (“The clemency power traditionally has been
used to entrench regimes by endear[ing] the sovereign to his subjects, rewarding
political supporters, and even lining the executive’s coffers.”) (internal quotation
marks and footnotes omitted).
368. See BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 940-41 (2004) (justifying the Rich pardon and
noting that most people in Rich’s position had been charged with a “civil offense”).
Controversial pardons are nothing new. See Krent, supra note 30, at 1675-76
(“Further, presidents have offered pardons in politically charged cases, such as
President Benjamin Harrison’s pardon of Mormons convicted of polygamy in the
Utah territory, President Carter’s commutation of Patricia Hearst’s sentence,
President Reagan’s pardon of George Steinbrenner, and President Bush’s pardon
of the Iran-Contra defendants, as well as President Clinton’s pardon of Mark
Rich.”) (citations omitted).
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that employ them) receiving remittals of fines from
beholden presidents. But this debate was already
resolved when the Constitution gave the president
the pardon power. For even the most shocking of
crimes, the Founders vested the presidency with the
prerogative to grant clemency based on the
assumption that the power would generally be used
in good faith.369 So, too, with civil offenses.
4. Military strategy. The fourth rationale for pardons,
which is perhaps the most important structural
reason, is to arm presidents with an extra tool to win
and end military conflicts. This theory, often
forgotten in the popular discourse about pardons, was
central to Hamilton’s thinking.370 History has
revealed Hamilton’s prescience: amnesties have
repeatedly been used to resolve wars, quell uprisings,
and solve other violent conflicts. Amnesty has, in fact,
been used in U.S. history only to resolve violent
conflicts.371 Civil forfeitures were a part of this
package of imposing pressure against adversaries,
including during the Civil War.372
369. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 123, at 42729.
370. As the American Revolution and the Civil War demonstrate, criminal
punishment, fines, and forfeitures are weapons during conflict. This concern
motivated Hamilton to push for a strong pardon power; in Federalist No. 74, he
explicitly linked military action and executive clemency, titling that work “[T]he
Command of the National Forces, and the Power of Pardoning.” Id. Hamilton
advocated a broad pardon power largely because of this concern. Id. (“In seasons
of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well-timed
offer of pardon to the insurgents and rebels may restore the tranquillity [sic] of
the commonwealth.”).
371. See Krent, supra note 30, at 1674-75 (“From an early date, presidents have
relied on the pardon power to issue general amnesties. President Washington
issued a Proclamation of Amnesty to the Whiskey Rebels in 1795; President
Adams granted an amnesty to the Pennsylvania insurgents in 1800; and
President Madison granted a general pardon to the Barataria pirates in 1815.
Presidents granted amnesties after the Civil War to the Southern rebels and to
draft dodgers following the Vietnam War as well.”) (internal citations omitted).
372. See Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589, 590-91 (“Confiscation Acts,”
authorizing the confiscation of rebels’ property); George C. Pratt & William B.
Petersen, Civil Forfeiture in the Second Circuit, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 653, 657-60
(1991) (discussing the expansive use of civil forfeiture during the Civil War).
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But consider what would happen if civil offenses were
imposed on one’s own citizens to support a military
effort. One’s own citizens could be subjected to civil
fines for failing to recycle metal, for violating curfews,
for consuming too much food or water or electricity,
for leaving lights on at night, and so on. But the
president would likely want to be able to pardon these
offenses: they would exist to increase compliance—
not to actually punish one’s own citizenry. Similarly,
if the United States entered a war with a foreign
country, assets of that country or its nationals located
in the United States could conceivably be forfeited—
and, again, the prospects for an armistice would be
strengthened if the president could remit these civiloffense penalties in exchange for peace.
5. Countering illegal or immoral legislation. A fifth basis
to permit pardons is that they can act as a safeguard
against overreaching by the legislature, thus serving
as a critical check when the legislature decides to
punish activities that are either constitutionally
protected or perfectly moral, such as criticizing the
president,373 engaging in same-sex relationships,374
marrying a person of a different race,375 or protesting
for women’s suffrage.376 This use of the pardon power
is controversial—especially if it occurs on a mass
basis rather than in a single case. After all, in such
scenarios the president is, in essence, negating the
will of the legislature—precisely because a law
operated as the legislature intended. That use of a
pardon raises the specter of King James II and his
373. See Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (making it a crime, punishable
by both a fine and prison, to publish “false, scandalous and malicious” criticism of
the government, Congress, or the President, “with intent to defame” them or “to
bring them . . . into contempt or disrepute”).
374. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
375. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
376. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
1918, at 509. Had the women been fined civilly for the net
cost to economic productivity of any traffic jams they caused—let us assume
$1,000,000 in present-day dollars—only a civil pardon, not a criminal pardon,
could have remitted that penalty.
THE U.S. FOR THE YEAR
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claim to have a “suspending” power;377 this approach
raises concerns that the Take Care Clause378 will be
breached and mirrors recent claims that Presidents
Bush and Obama are exceeding their constitutional
powers.
But such amnesties are no different structurally than
what happens during a conflict: during a wartime or
post-conflict amnesty, many of the laws enacted by
the legislature are summarily negated by the
president in order to achieve peace or to gain a
strategic advantage. Nevertheless, absent a crisis,
such maneuvers will spark great practical and
constitutional concerns.
Such a power, however, is still a useful check and
balance. Imagine if Congress imposed an apartheidlike curfew or registration requirements on a
particular minority group, enforced by civil penalties.
(E.g., imagine if a president had issued a daily
amnesty to all Japanese Americans during World
War II who disregarded a federal statute requiring
them to go to internment camps.) To be sure, a
president might conclude that the harm to the Take
Care Clause of enforcing any such statute was greater
than the harm of pardoning people who failed to
comply with it. And, of course, the president could be
impeached if he abused the pardon power
intolerably.379 The availability of clemency for civiloffenses is a check against extreme legislation.

377. See generally Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause:
English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575
(2008); see also Note, Executive Revision of Judicial Decisions, 109 HARV. L. REV.
2020, 2033 (1996) (“When used to remit fines, penalties, and forfeitures, the
pardon power can restore property as well as liberty; at the extreme, it can nullify
the operation of a criminal statute or provide a means by which the executive may
escape accountability for its actions.”) (internal citations omitted).
378. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
379. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925) (“Exceptional cases . . . would
suggest a resort to impeachment rather than to a narrow and strained
construction of the general powers of the President.”).
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6. Inter-Administration lenity.
Some
presidential
administrations are harsher than others. And when a
more-lenient president enters the White House, he
may wish to lessen the punishments that were meted
out during a prior administration (or during a time
when a different view prevailed about the appropriate
punishment for an offense). Every monarch in
England from Elizabeth to George III granted, with
Parliament’s blessing, amnesty for a wide array of
offenses, coinciding with their coronation;380 the acts
cast the monarchs as moderate and just. So, too, do
perceptions about culpability change over time in the
modern era. For example, Congress passed tough
drug laws in the 1980s—and those laws punished
crimes involving “crack” cocaine far more harshly
than crimes involving powder cocaine.381 Over time,
most policy makers concluded that the Draconian
sentencing rules for crack-cocaine offenses were too
harsh.382 President Obama signed legislation
amending these laws,383 but he also indicated that he
would grant pardons to non-violent offenders who
violated these laws—citing the excessive harshness of
those penalties.384 The same principle can apply to
civil offenses: one administration may enforce a
particular penalty far more strictly or frequently than
a prior administration,385 and a subsequent
380. See supra Part III.
381. Sari Horwitz, From a First Arrest to a Life Sentence, WASH. POST (July 15,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/07/15/from-a-firstarrest-to-a-life-sentence.
382. Id.
383. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220.
384. Sari Horwitz, President Obama Commutes Sentences of 95 Federal Drug
Offenders, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/president-obama-commutes-sentences-of-about-100-drugoffenders/2015/12/18/9b62c91c-a5a3-11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html
(describing Obama’s 95 commutations for cocaine-related convictions as “an effort
to give relief to drug offenders who were harshly sentenced in the nation’s war on
drugs”).
385. See, e.g., Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak
Very Loudly,” But What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New
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administration should be able to remit fines that have
not yet been paid.
7. Economic efficiency. Finally, a rationale rarely
explored—but that should be considered carefully by
future presidents—is to offer relief from laws that
harm economic growth.386 This final approach is likely
to be the most controversial of the rationales
discussed herein,387 but it is a place where pardoning
civil offenses can be especially useful. Pardoning civil
offenses is a potential way for presidents to
temporarily alleviate the effects of harsh laws or
inefficient regulation.388
For instance, imagine that the president concluded that
Congress’s intransigence in reforming the visa system for
immigrants whose labor the United States urgently
wanted—such as those seeking visas through the H-1B or H2B programs—was harming the economy. By issuing civil
pardons, the president could issue daily amnesties to pardon
both (i) foreigners who entered the United States on a tourist
visa and then sought a job and (ii) companies or farms that

Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209, 209-210 (2014) (noting that the largest
SEC penalty ever was $10 million in 2002; from 2000 to 2013, the average penalty
has been $57.9 million).
386. An eighth major basis has disappeared. Pardons, when they were common,
provided a reason for prisoners to behave well. See, e.g., supra text accompanying
note 43 (noting that in the late 1800s as many as 64.1% of federal prisoners
received clemency). But now that parole has become common and pardons have
become scarce, few prisoners would behave well solely in the hope of executive
clemency. Similarly, another major basis for pardons is inapplicable for civil
offenses: to solve prison overcrowding. See Krent, supra note 30, at 1675 (“Most
pardons, however, have been extended to individuals for reason of overcrowding
or compassion.”).
387. See, e.g., 3 BACON, supra note 257, at 802 (1786) (“The Power of pardoning
Offences is inseparably incident to the Crown; and this high Prerogative the King
is intrusted with upon a special Confidence, that he will spare those only whose
Case, could it have been foreseen, the Law itself may be presumed willing to have
excepted out of its general Rules, which the Wisdom of Man cannot possibly make
so perfect as to suit every particular Case.”).
388. This approach could, of course, be used for mischief, such as if a president
pardoned a monopolist daily for willfully crushing its puny competitors or bilking
customers.
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hired them.389 While each sunrise might usher in a new
offense, the president could reissue a daily pardon to cancel
any penalties for as long as his or her administration lasted.
This process of using recurring amnesties to temporarily
block the “heat” of legislation and regulation is referred to
herein—in a hat tip to the phrase “sunset legislation”—as
“cloud cover.”
That approach would certainly be controversial.390 But it
would play an important structural role to check a legislature
that was too active or to bypass a legislature that had become
inert. And even the threat of this tactic could likely pressure
Congress to act.
Ideally, any such amnesty would be issued with
congressional acquiescence, such as if the president acquired
a non-binding “sense of the Senate [or House]” or received the
blessing of congressional leaders to use this tactic. Although
no majority might acquiesce around a particular bill,
Congress might want to empower the president to issue
interim relief, which could be achieved through recurring
pardons. This approach would be helpful during a recession,
war, or crisis. The president could throw cloud cover over
legislation that slowed economic growth, reduced the
country’s ability to adapt to a crisis, or inflicted military
harm. For instance, if the country needed rare elements for
389. There is precedent for pardoning immigration violations. Multiple
examples were cited above. See supra Part III.D (noting that President Roosevelt
pardoned a person who had entered the United States illegally). The Supreme
Court recently affirmed, by a 4-4 vote, a lower court opinion invalidating
President Obama’s attempt to use administrative inaction to defer deportations.
United States v. Texas, No. 15-674 (2016) (upholding by inaction the trial court’s
preliminary injunction and the Fifth Circuit’s decision not to stay that
preliminary injunction from taking effect). To achieve similar goals without
running into problems under the Take Care Clause, presidents may, in the
coming years, decide to use executive clemency to grant relief for immigration
violations. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (requiring presidents to “take care that the laws
be faithfully executed”).
390. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925) (“If it be said that the
President, by successive pardons of constantly recurring contempts in particular
litigation might deprive a court of power to enforce its orders in a recalcitrant
neighborhood, it is enough to observe that such a course is so improbable as to
furnish but little basis for argument. Exceptional cases . . . would suggest a resort
to impeachment . . . .”).
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military hardware, the president could promise to pardon
people or companies who mined for these elements in
violation of civil statutes or regulations; the instant that the
offense occurred, he could pardon it.391 Congress could, of
course, lift these restrictions—but doing so would be slower,
and would permanently rescind the legislation. If Congress
disliked the president’s actions, it could call congressional
hearings, cut off funding, enact other legislative rules, or
even impeach the president. But the pardon power could, in
the interim, become a way to help the war effort (or the
economy, or the national response to some other crisis).
Ideally, Congress would pre-approve such pardons,
which would resemble the partnership between monarchs
and Parliament that led to the issuance of many acts of
amnesty.392
The regulatory pardon, used in this way, is a potentially
enormous presidential tool, the limits—and merits—of which
warrant far greater exploration than can be provided herein.
In short, however, this Article posits that this power can
sensibly be used during emergencies since the president is
able to grant amnesties faster than Congress can amend
legislation—and the effects would be temporary, since the
legislation remains in place. One wonders, for instance, if
amnesties from various regulations could, during the onset of
a financial crisis or a terror attack, provide helpful interim,
emergency legislative adaptation while Congress and
agencies debate more comprehensive reforms.
Congress would not acquiesce to this practice being used
unilaterally by presidents. A lively set of checks and balances
would ensue if the president sought to bypass Congress
completely, such as when Congress threatened to cut funding
to the Carter Administration after President Carter granted

391. Compare HAWKINS, supra note 172, Principle 61 (“The king could never
dispense with a statute before it was made.”), with id. Principle 62 (“The king
may pardon any offence after it is committed, so far as the public are concerned.”)
(emphasis in original).
392. Every monarch from Elizabeth I through George II issued amnesties of
what would now be civil offenses with Parliamentary approval, and George III
did the same thing—but without Parliament’s blessing. See supra Part III.
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amnesty to draft avoiders.393 As noted above, the president
and Congress would, ideally, partner together, just as kings
and queens worked with Parliament to issue general
pardons. For instance, a non-binding congressional
resolution during a crisis could authorize the president to use
the pardon power broadly for thirty days to advance
important national goals; the president could then return to
Congress at the end of this period to seek additional approval
to use civil amnesties to achieve policy effects.
Assessing how an amnesty toward civil offenses would
interact with the Take Care Clause and other separation of
powers concerns is beyond this Article’s ambition, but the
sheer complexity of the modern federal regulatory scheme
and the threat that excessive regulation can impair economic
growth warrants exploring this issue further.
CONCLUSION
The president may pardon civil offenses. English
monarchs and U.S. presidents pardoned and remitted
penalties for violations of the law that closely resemble
today’s civil offenses—both in the decades before and after
the Constitutional Convention. Although civil offenses
evolved from crimes, they did not exist at the birth of the
United States; even so, they resemble misdemeanors,
nuisances, civil forfeitures, “mulcts,” and “amercements”—
all of which English monarchs and U.S. presidents could
pardon. The debates and drafts from the Constitutional
Convention support the legality of clemency for civil offenses
conclusion. And case law has not resolved this issue, but it
leans toward permitting pardons of civil offenses. The policy
rationales behind pardons likewise suggest that clemency for
civil offenses comports with the original reasons that the
Founders gave presidents broad clemency powers.
To be sure, risks exist (as with criminal pardons) that
presidents might abuse the power that this Article suggests
393. See Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws:
Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 962-63 (1994)
(describing how Congress attached a rider to the Fiscal Year 1978 appropriation
bill, barring the Justice Department from using any funds to carry out President
Carter’s pardons of Vietnam-era draft resisters).
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they wield. But that risk has always existed with pardons. It
is more likely that the Executive Branch would grant relief
in cases in which the law was applied too harshly—just as
with pardons of crimes. This Article has hinted at several
other possible uses of the untapped power to grant clemency
for civil offenses. The republic can weather all these
scenarios. And given that the Constitution was designed to
protect citizens against the risk that the “Federal
Government should overpass the just bounds of its authority
and make a tyrannical use of its powers”394—and that literally
tens of thousands of federal civil offenses exist—it hardly
seems surprising to think that the Founders would want the
president to be able to remit civil penalties that impose too
great of a burden.
But this Article is not, ultimately, making a normative
case that clemency should exist for civil offenses. Rather, it
is suggesting that this power, though neglected, has existed
since 1787. We cannot yet know how presidents will use the
power to grant clemency for civil offenses. But—as with
pardons for crimes—the choice is theirs.

394. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 123, at 173-76.

